

THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT IN UKRAINE DURING 1940s-1950s
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASE STUDY OF THE
UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (OUN-UPA)

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General Studies

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ABSTRACT

THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT IN UKRAINE DURING 1940s-1950s LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASE STUDY OF THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (OUN-UPA), by Major Pavlo Savchenko, 102 pages.

This thesis aims to analyze the insurgency in Ukraine, organized shortly before WWII and led by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) during WWI and in the years immediately after WWII. The main goal of this analysis is to determine if the insurgency was effective, and if the insurgency was effective, what aspects could be considered as effective activities and why the insurgency was ultimately succumbed to defeat by the Soviet Union.

After the failing to gain the independence of Ukraine after WWI, different Ukrainian political parties, primarily in Western Ukraine, directed their activities toward reestablishing the sovereign and independent Ukraine. One of the political parties, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, consolidated the most decisive nationalist cadres, and became the fundamental organization of the liberation movement. After the German-Soviet war started, the most radical OUN wing decided to wage an uncompromising war on “two fronts;” against Nazi Germany and Communist Soviet Union. The OUN became the pillar for forming the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The Ukrainian insurgency resisted the occupational regimes for about fourteen years, but was ultimately defeated by the Soviet authorities in the mid-1950s.

This research describes the nature of Ukrainian insurgency, answering the questions as to what were the causes of success and what were the causes of the final defeat. Analyzing the effectiveness of the organization, the author focused more on the military aspects of the insurgent activities, and recommended what insurgent tactics, techniques and procedures could be applied effectively to current Ukrainian military doctrine.

Ukrainian military and law enforcement institutions should examine the lessons learned from the case of the Ukrainian insurgency, particularly with respect to the OUN-UPA, with the purposes of understanding the causes of insurgency, developing effective mechanisms for preventing an insurgency, and establishing effective techniques for conducting a counter-insurgency, while extracting concepts from the experiences of the UPA for inclusion in the Ukrainian Military doctrine concerning unconventional warfare.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to research and analyze the actions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) through the years 1942 to 1953. That armed liberation formation was established during first years of the WWII on the Western Ukrainian territories by nationalistic stratum with the purpose of obtaining independence for Ukraine by armed revolution. The uniqueness is that the insurgency did not get any external political or financial assistance. Despite being defeated by the Soviet regime in the early 1950s, Ukrainian insurgents fought against Nazi Germany from the time of their formation, and continued to resist against Soviet authorities after Soviet Ukraine was liberated from the Nazi invasion. This study will show that the UPA's survivability and effectiveness on the tactical level led to their successes and longevity.

The Situation

After WWI, while new states appeared in place of recently powerful empires, a new political order was beginning in Eastern Europe. Redundant, the Ukraine was partitioned between several major powers; the Soviet Union in the East, Romania in the South and Southwest, and Poland and Czechoslovakia in the West. Anti-Bolshevik insurrections in the territories occupied by the Soviet regime continued until 1921. Insurgents were united in more than one hundred detachments and counted about forty thousand people. The famous warlord Mahno, supported by the local population, resisted in the southern territories until August 1921. In late 1921, Soviet authorities attempted to defeat the insurgent resistance by sending an army force of over fifty thousand men,

mostly manned by Soviet State Security (NKVD) units. The Soviets intended to prevent once and for all any attempt by the Ukrainian population to obtain independence by using mass starvation, mass arrests, and state sponsored terror.¹

Despite the principle of self-determination becoming generally accepted in Eastern Europe, the principle was not applied everywhere. As a result, not every ethnic entity achieved statehood. Those that succeeded had large and dense ethnic minorities. Therefore, the national issue of independence for Ukraine was not solved during the interwar period. As tensions between dominating nations and suppressed minorities increased, the situation ultimately became explosive. About seven million western Ukrainians, mostly former subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy, did not gain independence. Most of them resided in Poland, the rest were portioned throughout Romania and Czechoslovakia. Ethnic Ukrainians everywhere, especially in Poland and Romania, became the object of discriminatory policies. The ethnic Ukrainians possessed a desire for self-determination to solve their social and cultural problems. The countries assimilating the ethnic Ukrainians opposed the creation of a sovereign Ukrainian state which caused further conflicts.²

With the end of World War I hostilities, in 1920 in Prague, a group of Ukrainians, mostly former Austro-Hungarian officers, secretly founded the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO). The UVO aimed to continue the armed struggle against the Polish occupation. Colonel Yevhen Konovalets, one of the famous leaders of Ukrainian revolutionary activity, was elected as the head of the organization. Initially UVO was a military organization with appropriate command and control systems. The UVO secretly recruited and trained demobilized veterans of WWI from Galicia as well as interned

soldiers from Czechoslovakia. These recruits furthered the anti-Polish insurrection and carried out actions aimed to destabilize the Polish occupational regime. The situation facing the UVO changed harshly in 1923. The recognition by the Triple Entente of the Polish authority's legitimacy caused doubts about the sense of further resistance among many western Ukrainians. As a result, many of the reliable members of the UVO left the organization. Repressed by Polish police, Konovalets and most of his leadership were forced to leave Galicia and establish their headquarters abroad.

The crisis caused the UVO to undergo a fundamental reorientation. Konovalets requested financial and political assistance from foreign states; first of all from Poland's enemies—Germany and Lithuania. At the same time, the UVO started to recruit youths from gymnasiums and universities to fill the growing gaps in personnel. To disseminate political views in Galicia, the UVO smuggled its magazine *Surma* (the Bugle). The most significant action was that the UVO connected with such student's groups as "Ukrainian Nationalist Youths" in Prague, "The Legion of Ukrainian Nationalists" in Poděbrady, and "Association of Ukrainian Nationalist Youths" in Lvov with the purpose of setting up hotspots of nationalist tendencies. After some planning conferences, in 1929 representatives of the UVO and the student groups founded the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The OUN consisted of the Homeland Executive Command, manned with Galicia's youths, subordinated to the Command of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad, under leadership of Konovalets and his staff. The OUN played a much bigger role than the UVO did. Like its predecessor, the OUN remained an underground party. The OUN maintained military principles of leadership and extremely high discipline while it conducted a campaign of political terror against the Polish

authorities and the pro-Bolshevik population. At the same time, the OUN worked to lead a widespread revolutionary movement with the purpose of meeting nationalist interests. The OUN concentrated significant efforts on the popularization of its political views, mainly among the youth. In that way, the OUN tried to overcome resistance from all social, political and economic organizations in Western Ukraine.³

The OUN Philosophies

There were significant tensions between the OUN leadership, which surpassed the conflict. The Ukrainian liberation movement was directed by the Command of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad, represented by older leaders, hardened by years and experience. These older leaders were raised during the more “civilized” pre-war period generation of Konovalets and his fellows from the time of 1917-1920. Despite their background, these leaders were doubtful about the particular tactical methods of OUN, especially assassinations. Too often, these leaders found controlling their subordinates in Western Ukraine was difficult. Not opposing violence, Konovalets and his staff preferred a more sophisticated method and put more effort into obtaining assistance from foreign states, especially Germany.

Their subordinated Homeland Executive Command, headed by Stepan Bandera and his staff, on the other hand, kept the tactic of the revolutionary struggle alive. Most of those young radical members were barely older than twenty and they did not know the humiliations and infamy of the Polish occupation. There were tremendous differences in the philosophies of the older moderate members and the younger radical members which caused a great rift in the movement. Those tensions increased after the entire Homeland Executive leadership was imprisoned in the Bereza Kartuzka concentration camp in 1934.

According to unproved information, mentioned in OUN's bibliography, the imprisonment happened because of an act of treason by the high leadership of Command of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad.

Despite all these tensions Konovalts had enough authority, tolerance and diplomacy to lead both groups and prevent a catastrophic conflict from rising. That is why Konovalts' assassination by a Soviet agent in Rotterdam in 1938 was a destructive blow to the Ukrainian nationalist movement. After that, the OUN appeared to be without unitary leadership.⁴ Former Austro-Hungarian colonel Andriy Melnyk headed the Command of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad. He relied upon Germany as an ally and accepted semi-independence from Germany in exchange for German assistance in efforts against the Polish and Soviet forces. To the nationalists in Western Ukraine, the new OUN leadership abroad appeared to be just a group of opportunists, who coordinated their plans with the German authorities. To the nationalists, the new political way was a play for Ukrainian patriotic popular support, for the people trusted OUN. In early January of 1940, Stepan Bandera moved to Rome, where Melnyk and his staff were at that time. Because of the probable war between Germany and the Soviet Union, Bandera proposed that Melnyk move the headquarters to neutral Switzerland and direct OUN's activity both within and outside the Ukraine. Bandera also proposed that all activities focus on the principles of absolute Ukrainian independence and the recognition as allies only those countries which recognize and respect the Ukraine as a sovereign and independent state. He also proposed that the OUN should wait relative to Germany; if the German government expresses hostility to Ukraine's independence, the OUN will fight against the Germans as well as against the Soviets. Melnyk accepted some of the secondary demands

and threatened to punish any act of “rebellion.” The negotiations aimed to localize internal conflict and lasted one month. Unfortunately, the problems were not solved. Finally, not achieving any satisfactory compromise, principal OUN activists and representatives of Homeland Executive met at the conference on February 10, 1940 and established the Revolutionary Command of OUN. They also unanimously elected Stepan Bandera as their leader. Bandera understood the challenges and the responsibilities for the future revolutionary-liberation movement. He was aware that establishing the Revolutionary Command and electing him as the commander would cause internal upheavals among OUN members because those actions will necessitate the displacement of OUN colonel Melnyk and his adherents. But Bandera also understood that disciplined reorganization and focus on Melnyk’s position will not just devalue the revolutionary-liberation movement, but also will affect the entire patriotic struggle of the Ukrainian population. The effort may even show the Ukraine to the world society as a “cart of the German imperialistic machine.” In the spring of 1941, the Second Emergency Great Conference of OUN took place in Krakow. That Conference approved the Act of Establishing the Revolutionary Command assigned on February 10, 1940, and illegitimacy of assigning Andriy Melnyk as a Head of Command of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad. Stepan Bandera was elected unanimously as the new Commander in Chief of the OUN. At the same Conference it was requested that colonel Melnyk, who refused to attend, stop any activity under the name of OUN, because his political positions contradicted the main ideology-political positions of OUN. Melnyk could withdraw from the political arena or establish new party with another name. Melnyk and his adherents did not recognize the acts of the Conference and, using the name of the

Command of Ukrainian Nationalists, conducted a closed trial, which awarded a death sentence to Bandera and the other nine members of Revolutionary Command of OUN.⁵

The trial caused the absolute split of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists into two mutually exclusive branches. OUN's branch headed by Melnyk, mentioned in historical bibliography as OUN(m) (Melnyk's branch), also pursued Ukrainian national interests, as indicated by the number of OUN(m) members who fought heroically for Ukrainian independence. Additionally, Melnyk's organization felt the same repression from the Nazi regime. OUN(b) (Bandera's branch), headed by Stepan Bandera, was the "OUN" which attempted to establish the regular Ukrainian army, and became the predecessor of Ukrainian Insurgent Army.⁶

The Prominent Philosophy

Ukrainian nationalists saw German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 as an opportunity to attain independence and to establish Ukrainian statehood. Despite the fact that the OUN and Germany had a common enemy, their end states were different. The German government saw the benefit of cooperating with the OUN in using the OUN as subversive forces in the Soviet rear. At the same time, after Hitler initiated the Hungarian invasion into the Carpathian Ukraine (Ukrainian territories controlled by Czechoslovakia), Ukrainian nationalists did not want to be simply a German tool in this war. They saw as an end state, to profit by furthering the war effort and spreading their influence among all the Ukrainian territories. In such way, each side wanted to use the situation to meet their own goals.

As a result of cooperation between the Germans and the OUN, shortly before the German invasion, a Ukrainian unit called "The legion of Ukrainian nationalists" was

formed within the German army. The unit was manned primarily with Ukrainians from the territories occupied by the Germans, who were sympathetic to Bandera's leadership. The unit counted about 600 soldiers (officer positions were occupied exclusively by Germans) and consisted of two battalion size units with code names "Nachtigall" and "Roland." The German Command planned to use them for subversive purposes, but OUN-B expected those battalions to become the heart of the future Ukrainian army.

During the first days of the German occupation, conflicts between the nationalists and the Germans emerged. OUN-B supported by "Nachtigall" made a daring step. Without any approval from German authorities, on June 30, 1940, in occupied Lvov, and declared the establishment of the Ukrainian State. Playing a very risky game, OUN-B leadership expected that the German military would likely agree with an independent Ukraine rather than confront the Ukrainians from the very first day of the invasion.

Despite OUN-B's estimates pertaining to the reaction of the German military command being quite accurate, the organization's leaders completely miscalculated the Nazi Supreme political leadership's reaction. In a few days after the declaration of independence, the Gestapo arrested Bandera and his followers.

In keeping with their strategy of confronting the Germans, the OUN decided to organize and control local administrations through the territories of Ukraine just liberated from the Soviets. With that purpose in mind, roughly two thousand OUN members divided into so called "marching groups," were tasked to move East behind the advancing German troops, to identify nationalistic leaders in each village or town and to build up the local administration around them. Because the German military authorities showed themselves to be relatively tolerant during the first months of occupation, a lot of eastern

Ukrainians, with the assistance of OUN's marching groups, organized local self-government. Expecting the Germans to dissolve the collective farms and re-distribute the land among individual farmers, the villagers gathered the harvest under extremely hard conditions. Quite often local school teachers organized schools, and workers supervised production in the plants and factories themselves. Priests who survived the terror and repressions of the 1930s conducted church services and the christening of children and youths. More than one hundred non-communist newspapers and magazines appeared across the whole country. Many literary, scientific and social groups were formed in the larger cities, especially in Kiev. Simultaneously, as the Soviet power collapsed in the Ukraine, the social, cultural and administrative activity of the Ukrainian population significantly increased. The Ukrainians hoped that the Germans were about to establish an independent Ukrainian state.

However, the Nazi government had a different view of that issue. Irritated that Ukrainian nationalists did not learn the lesson of what happens to those who do not cease attempting to establish their own government as at the June 30, 1940 meeting in Lvov, the Nazi administration that replaced the German Army administration, decided to repeat that lesson, but with much more pressure. In September 1941, SS-units arrested and executed many of the OUN "marching groups." Two months later, the Gestapo focused on OUN-M. Forty members of Melnyk's fraction were shot. Later, Nazi authorities removed nationalistic oriented individuals from positions in the administration, police and press. Nationalists switched to a more clandestine method of activity. Obviously the short "honeymoon" with the Nazi regime was over. After that period, the OUN operated

without any hopes of external assistance and faced two adversaries who did not have any kind of Ukrainian statehood in their end states—Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.⁷

The Birth of the UPA

As the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) Supreme Command stated officially, the UPA evolved from the OUN “marching groups” headed by Bandera in 1942 during the German invasion. There are no doubts that with the political-psychological condition of the Ukrainian population some kind of insurgency, directed against both occupiers of Ukraine, would appear, even without provocation by the OUN. But without the OUN direction as the organizational center, that insurgency would repeat the experience of the piecemeal defeat of the separate guerilla warlords’ detachments during the period 1917-1923. As a result of the efforts of the OUN, the peoples’ resistance was shaped by a coherent Ukrainian Insurgent Army, with the commonly accepted, singular political face, under a unified command and political leadership structure.

The plan of creating special combat detachments within the OUN was developed by the OUN military expert in Western Ukraine, Vasyl Sydor. The plan was for those detachments to conduct raids in the Eastern Ukraine or for those detachments to be initiators of anti-Polish insurgency in Western Ukraine. The plan’s first such detachment, called “Wolves,” was formed in Polesie (Northern lands of Ukraine) in July, 1937 with 25 well-trained and tested OUN fighters. Shortly after, that, another similar unit was organized. During the German-Polish war, those detachments disarmed several Polish police units and engaged in battle with withdrawing Polish army troops. After the Bolshevik regime came to power, the OUN members from Galicia became Polish citizens

by crossing the border into the Nazi controlled sector, and the members who were residents of Polesie laid down their weapons and disbanded.

In 1942 the OUN commissioner Vasyl Sydor came to Polesie and Volyn (North-Western lands of Ukraine) for the purpose of studying the political situation in those territories. He reestablished contacts with former combatants and tested the idea of forming the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, as proposed by the one of the local OUN members. He directed under his authority further organizing and manning of future UPA detachments. Very soon many new insurgent units were organized in Volyn and Polesie.⁸

The first UPA detachment was organized in Polesie in October, 1942. The reason Polesie was the location was that in addition to the German pressure, Ukrainian resistance was threatened also by the Bolshevik partisans and the Polish colonists. The Supreme Soviet leadership put significant emphasis on the issue of partisan warfare, and started to deploy partisan units into the German rear during the first months of the war. Because of Polesie's restrictive forests and swampy terrain, those lands became a heaven for operations by Red partisans. The attitude of the Partisans toward the local population was hostile from the start, fed by the concept that all Ukrainians were nationalists who fought bolshevism and the USSR. They robbed, plundered and killed locals suspected of belonging to the UPA. The Red partisans were supported by the Polish colonists. Logically, the resistance of the Polish population should have been directed against Germany and the Soviet Union, who together destroyed Poland in 1939. Instead, Poles in the Western Ukraine actively cooperated both with Nazi authorities and the Red partisans. Knowing the Ukrainian population, local Poles were especially dangerous when cooperating with the Red partisans as informants and guides. In such

circumstances, the OUN Supreme Command realized the importance of a simultaneous uprising among all the Ukrainian territories. Accordingly, the OUN Supreme Command directed its sections in all lands to rise to the situation. The situation made Polesie the ideal place to nurture the insurgency and form the first UPA detachment.⁹

In the first UPA fights with German troops, Red partisans and Polish supporters inspired the local population. The number of UPA's personnel increased because of mass voluntary recruitment of locals. By February 1943, in addition to the two established units, three new company-size detachments were organized. In March 1943, many departments of supporting police (German units manned with local Ukrainians) turned to the UPA. Because of this influx, company-size units reformed to battalions, and additional new companies were organized. The whole task organization received the official name "UPA-North." During the period May to June of 1943, UPA units established control over the whole Polesie and Volyn area, limiting German authority solely to big cities, motorways and railways. At the same time, the UPA reduced Polish influence and reduced the Red partisans' areas of operation.

In spring 1943, UPA detachments spontaneously organized in the central part of Ukraine, west from the Dnepr River. Six companies from UPA-North reinforced those units. In this way, a new UPA territorial command, "UPA-South." was established. During the summer of 1943, the Ukrainian People's Resistance in Galicia started to reorganize as a part of the UPA. Colonel "Shelest" (Vasyl Sydor) managed the process of reorganization, creating "UPA-West," and when the process was finished, he headed the organization. With UPA activities spreading through the territories and creating new territorial Commands UPA-West and UPA-South, the UPA Supreme Command was

established, tied to the OUN by the General Military Staff. In autumn 1943, the first insurgent units raised in Bukovyna and Bessarabia (South-Western territories of Ukraine), received the temporary name “Bukovyna’s Ukrainian Resistance Army.” In May 1944 the units took the general name UPA, reunited and became the administrative part of UPA-West.¹⁰ The last large combat between German units and UPA-West took place 9-16 July 1944. As the Bolsheviks approached Lvov, just small Ukrainian territories remained under German control.¹¹

With the approach of the Red Army, the UPA faced the challenging problem of how to infiltrate to the Bolshevik’s rear through the German-Soviet front line. The withdrawing German army did not threaten the UPA anymore. Multinational units especially, such as Hungarians, avoided engagements with the UPA units. But advancing Soviet troops threatened the UPA. During the period 1944 to 1945, the UPA units suffered significant losses, especially UPA-South. Two months of intensive fighting in UPA-South, during which the Bolsheviks deployed division-size units supported by tanks and army aviation inflicted many UPA casualties. Because of that, the UPA Supreme Command disbanded UPA-South, and subordinated surviving units to UPA-North and UPA-West. The tragic experience of UPA-South forced the UPA leadership to change the tactic of infiltration through the front line. In the summer of 1944, all UPA formations were ordered to split into not more than company-size units and to move to the Carpathian Mountains or other large forested areas, and to split into platoon or squad size in less forested areas. That technique was justified as the Red Army was concerned about pursuing withdrawing Germans, and did not engage small insurgent units.¹²

But the situation changed at the end of 1944. The UPA detachments, which infiltrated into the battle area, were faced with a threat qualitatively higher and different from the regular Red Army; the threat of the Soviet Ministry of the Interior (MVD) and Soviet State Security (MGB) units. Beginning the summer of 1944 and up to the autumn of 1945, the main task for UPA's detachments was to survive engagements with MVD-MGB forces, while remaining in the territories controlled by Soviets and analyzing the new threat and its way of fighting. Combating the insurgency, MVD-MGB units conducted blockades, deploying sometimes thousands of troops, including regular units of the Red Army. Then blockaded territories were fined for insurgents' presence.¹³

The situation changed significantly after 1947, when the governments of the Soviet Union and Communist Poland conducted Operation "Vistula," forcing the resettlement of Ukrainian population of the territories west from the Curzon Line to western Poland, and instead the Polish population was forced to the Western Ukraine.¹⁴ The UPA was deprived of local support. In addition, MVD-MGB units blockaded villages with the purpose of preventing resupply of large insurgent formations by the locals. All of that caused changes in UPA organization and tactics. The UPA turned from a mass insurgency to an underground resistance. Large formations continued to fight only in areas with suitable terrain. The remainder of UPA units formed small bands aimed on wide spread political and propaganda activities.¹⁵

Fighting with the mass of Soviet MVD-MGB forces, being isolated by the pro-communist countries in the West, and suffering from the lack of supplies, UPA suffered the biggest losses during the period 1948-1950. Most of UPA's leadership was assassinated in that period as a result of the Bolshevik's new tactic; identify an

underground leader, all his background, strengths and weaknesses, family relations, with the purpose the analyzing the situation to determine the best way of physically destroying the leader and organization.¹⁶

The open and organized resistance slowed down during the late forties. After the UPA's Supreme Commander, Roman Shuhevych, was killed during the fight with a MGB unit on March 5, 1950, the UPA ceased to exist as a unified military organization. Despite all of those setbacks, separate UPA detachments continued the struggle up to 1954, when the new UPA Supreme Commander was captured. Even after that, small insurgent groups continued to resist to the end of fifties.¹⁷

The Problem Statement

The Ukrainian insurgency was created when the war between the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany started. It became obvious during the years 1939-1941 that the Soviets were not going to recognize any kind of Ukrainian statehood. Germany's intent concerning Ukrainian independence was clarified in June 1941, when OUN members declared the establishment of the State of Ukraine. Therefore, Ukrainian liberation movements faced two threats from the two biggest world powers at that time—Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union. The Ukrainian resistance could not expect any external assistance because of the opposing views of the World of pro-Nazi and anti-Nazi blocks. Despite the OUN-UPA not achieving its political end state, and being totally defeated in mid-1950s, and only existing for a period of about ten years, it was one of the biggest insurgencies of that period. The effectiveness of the OUN-UPA was the probable cause of its survivability. Why the OUN-UPA was so effective any why it ultimately lost is needed to be identified.

The Research Question

Given the problem as described, to understand the phenomenon of the OUN-UPA for the purpose of further extracting lessons learned from their experience, my primary question is “Why then did the OUN-UPA officially disband in late 1940s after only a short time as an effective force?”

In order to examine the experience of the UPA insurgency in the context of current Ukrainian military doctrine, it is necessary to identify whether the insurgency was effective on the tactical level, and, if so, to measure its effectiveness. Thus, the second question is “What made the UPA effective for so long?”

Finally, concerning ongoing reconstruction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and foundation of such service as Special Operation Forces, it would be useful to apply the UPA’s experience in current Ukrainian military doctrine. Hence, there is the last question “What the lessons learned from study of the Ukrainian insurgency should apply to current military doctrine?”

Assumptions

In the conduct of the study, I considered three assumptions. The first assumption is that the UPA was tactically and operationally effective. The second assumption is that the UPA survived for so long because of its flexibility, which it demonstrated as a combination of achieving the tactical and operational goals with ability to adapt to a changing and complex situation. The last assumption is that in the political situation that appeared after WWII, even if the UPA would continue tactically effective resistance, it would not achieve its political end state, absolute sovereignty and independence, because of a lack of external political support.

Limitations

The following are the limitations for this research. First, because of the nature of this study and as compliance for the researcher's requirements for Masters of Military Arts and Science Program, time available for research was critical. The study spans a 10-month period tied to the CGSC curriculum.

Secondly, there are significant challenges in gathering the necessary information. To reach this research's objective, the issue of Ukrainian insurgency should be examined not just from the Ukrainian perspective, but also from the German and the Soviet point of view. There is much information available through the Combined Arms Research Library or on the Internet. However, the major part of reliable and objective information is contained in the files of the Ukrainian National archives. A portion of the information is available from the Ukraine, but the process of filling information gaps is difficult because of the problematic process of requesting information from the Ukrainian archives through the Internet.

The language issue is the third limitation for the researcher. Because the researcher is not an English native speaker, there is a significant challenge to complete this research within required time limits. To be more objective and thorough it is obviously important to study the issue of Ukrainian insurgency not just from Ukrainian, but also from German and Soviet primary sources. Russian language sources do not challenge the researcher, but working on Germany's primary sources is possible only when those documents are translated into English. Also, most of the sources are published in the Ukrainian or Russian languages, and it is difficult to find printed

materials outside the Ukraine. The solution is to request from the Ukrainian state archives via the Internet, and this limitation refers to the previous one-limited sources.

Finally, a specific limitation was the chronology of the OUN-UPA. Although officially the UPA was established in 1942, the dynamic of the OUN genesis, as the predecessor and inspirer of Ukrainian insurgency, needed to be considered. Because what happened in the OUN prior to forming the UPA significantly impacted on the UPA, the chronological limits of the UPA effectiveness analysis should be extended. For the same reason, the author does not conclude the research with a definite year, when the Ukrainian insurgency disappeared. Despite the cessation of OUN-UPA resistance in the early 1950s, separate groups continued to fight up to late 1950s. Therefore, determining the date of the UPA defeat is nearly impossible.

Scope and Delimitations

The study is focused on the tactical effectiveness of Ukrainian liberation movement, organized and conducted by the underground Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) as the political machine and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as the combat formation of the overall movement. The methods of guerilla war, which Ukrainian insurgents applied, are analyzed during two periods of the resistance; the period of German occupation (1941-1944); and the period of German withdraw from the territory of Ukraine in 1944 up to late the 1950s, when the UPA ceased.

Significance of the Study

The OUN-UPA's experience is important in view of the contemporary operational environment, as is evidenced by the conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechen and Dagestan

Autonomy Republics of the Russian Federation and a number of other locations. Despite the revolutionary-liberation movement being doomed to fail from the beginning because of the powerful adversaries, it existed for more than twelve years. Therefore, the key to its survivability should be examined. The UPA did not import insurgency from abroad. Armed resistance to the Nazi and the Soviet occupations was distinctly a Ukrainian phenomenon. The researcher is aiming to study how the Ukrainian underground could organize and build its own insurgent formation in such a short time within nearly absolute isolation. The UPA did not have any external support. Also flexibility and adaptability to a changing and complex environment as a cornerstone of the UPA's survivability is a subject of this research.

¹ОрестСубтельний [OrestSubtelny], *Україна: Історія[Ukraine: A History]* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1993), 329.

²Ibid., 369.

³Ibid., 383-384.

⁴Ibid., 386.

⁵ПетроМірчук [Petro Mirchuk], *СтепанБандера: СимволРеволюційноїБезкомпромисовості [Stepan Bandera: The Symbol of Revolutionary Sturdiness]* (New York–Toronto, 1961), 63-70.

⁶ОрестСубтельний [OrestSubtelny], *Україна: Історія[Ukraine: A History]*, 410.

⁷Ibid., 401-403.

⁸ПетроМірчук [Petro Mirchuk], *УкраїнськаПовстанськаАрмія: 1942-1952 [Ukrainian Insurgent Army: 1942-1952]* (Munich: Cicero, 1953), 229-232.

⁹Ibid., 30-33.

¹⁰Ibid., 41-43.

¹¹Ibid., 49-50.

¹²Ibid., 87.

¹³Ibid., 106.

¹⁴Андрей Липкан [Andrey Lipkan], “Операция ‘Висла’: Переселение или Депортация?” [Operation ‘Vistula’: Deportation or Resettlement?], *Журнал Военная История* [The Military History Journal] no. 1 (2003), http://warhistory-ukrlife.ru/1_03_9.htm (accessed 14 November 2011).

¹⁵Петро Мірчук [Petro Mirchuk], *Українська Повстанська Армія: 1942-1952* [Ukrainian Insurgent Army: 1942-1952], 193-195.

¹⁶Ibid., 220-224.

¹⁷“OUN-UPA: A History,” ОУН-УПА: Легенда Супротиву [OUN-UPA: The Legend of Resistance], <http://oun-upa.info/history/> (accessed 10 December 2011).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter discusses the available research materials relevant to the study. There is a wide range of resource materials on the Ukrainian liberation movement. This information formerly classified by the Soviet security services, became an object of increased interest by a large number of researchers and historians. Therefore, there are many unreliable sources among publications about the OUN-UPA's activity. Primary sources presented by original UPA, Soviet and German documents are no longer classified. Even so, the procedure of requesting those files is very complicated, especially through on-line request and information distribution.

Core Literature

The most significant references for this study, which the author classifies as core literature, are the documentaries and memoirs of the UPA's leadership. Despite the references containing what some would call propaganda, the author identifies the literature as reliable. Because of positions the mentioned writers held and information that they had access to, the works give a relatively accurate description of the Ukrainian insurgency. Some of the main sources that belonged to the UPA's supreme leadership are listed below.

The first author, who the researcher has addressed, is Petro Mirchuk. He was the one of founders of the OUN and the editor of periodical nationalistic publishing prior to WWII. Mirchuk was arrested by the Gestapo during the first months of the German invasion, and was imprisoned in a concentration camp up to the end of the war. After his

discharge, following the instruction of the UPA Supreme Commander, Roman Shuhevych, he moved to the United States with the mission to write a history of the UPA. His work 'Ukrainian Insurgent Army: 1942-1952' gives very clear understanding of the revolutionary-liberation activity in Ukraine and particularly the insurgency's methods. In this work he addressed various aspects of the UPA's activity, such as its task organization, logistics, tactics, principles of security and conspiracy, as well as the interrelations between political and combat struggle. The researcher used this work as a fundamental resource during the writing of this study.

The second author, whose works were used during this study, is Mykola Lebed, one of the leaders of the OUN-UPA and first chief of the security service of the UPA, who played a significant role in the foundation of the organization. His documentary 'The UPA: its Genesis, Build Up and Activities in the Liberation Struggle of the Ukrainian Population for the Ukrainian Independent State' shows the changing methods of armed resistance in the two periods: the German invasion and the establishment of the Soviet authorities in Ukrainian territories.

Another important source category is the collection of UPA's publications, edited and issued after Ukraine attained independence in 1991. The most voluminous is the 'Litopys UPA' (the Chronicle of the UPA): a multiple-volume documentary which is published by Ukrainian immigrants in Canada, former participants of the UPA, with support of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, the Institute of Ukrainian Archives of M. S. Hrushevsky and Chief Archival Directorate of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. It is the serial publication, which aims to issue documents and materials about the UPA with maximum precision. All documents are reprinted preserving the original

form and content. Usually, reprinted publications are made from originals. But in case the original is not available the most reliable copy or reprint is used as a source. The source is always given, and in the case of reprinted archive files, the location of those files is also given. Each volume has references of personalities and places, and a dictionary of unclear, rarely used words and acronyms. A large portion of the information in this research is taken from the “Litopys UPA.”

To remain objective, the author also addressed the points of view of UPA opponents—the documents of the German military and political leadership concerning the guerilla activity in Ukrainian territories, and the documents of the Soviet authorities, issued primarily by the state security (MVD-MGB) units. Some of them are reprinted from the originals; others are analyzed by historians and published as scientific researches. As an example, the work “OUN-UPA during the years of war,” published by the famous Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Serhiychuk, contains little known, or mostly unknown, materials which were classified “Top Secret” not long ago.

Supporting Literature

The body of supporting literature for this study provided the background on the general situation in Eastern Europe, and particularly in Ukraine, during the period of 1930s-1950s. The literature comprises works of the participants of the Ukrainian liberation movement as well as works published by historians after WWII.

The prime source which describes the history of Ukraine, particularly during the mentioned periods, is the major work of the famous Canadian historian Orest Subtelny, published by University of Toronto Press in 1988. Written before the Soviet Union

collapsed and translated into both Ukrainian and Russian during the reforms of President Gorbachev, this work has been re-published many times in Ukraine.

Many of the Internet sources were not excluded during writing this research. Despite many unproved and unreliable sources, which are not acceptable by existing standards, some Web sites contain information citing the original sources. The main electronic sources are the web-site 'OUN-UPA: the legend of resistance' and the official web-site of the Liberation Movement Research Center, which contains information about the Ukrainian liberation revolution, the underground and insurgent activities of the Ukrainian nationalists, and a number of archive documents, documentaries and memoirs, books and research, articles related to the issue of the OUN-UPA. All of the links cite the original sources identifying when and where they were published. These electronic sources were significantly helpful for writing the study, especially with respect to challenges of getting printed documentation from Ukrainian official libraries and archives.

The body of literature, core and supporting, provided the author the analytical foundation to understand the nature of Ukrainian insurgency, identify its strong and weak points, measure its effectiveness and find out the causes of its failure. While choosing the literature for the research, the author followed the principles of completeness of information, impartiality and objectivity.

Limitations

To name historical personalities, organizations or geographical places which do not have definite translation into English was challenging for the author. First of all, historical places and regions of Ukraine, mentioned in this research, have originally

Ukrainian names. Only their Russian language interpretations have been translated to English. That is why most of them might be confusing for the reader. Secondly, most of the organizations, branches and units within the OUN-UPA were not translated to English, nor were they abbreviated. The author has solved this problem by putting all specific acronyms and abbreviations into the list with descriptions. Finally, transliteration of the names of personalities to the English language made the author significantly concerned. To solve the problem, he referred to publications in English, where those characters were mentioned.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research examined the effectiveness of the insurgency in Ukraine (the Ukrainian Insurgent Army) from 1942 to 1950. This chapter in particular discusses the research methodology utilized for this research. The different tools and techniques for data gathering and data analysis are discussed, as well as the actual procedures followed for gathering information.

This chapter also discusses the measure of effectiveness for assessing and evaluating the resistance conducted by insurgents in Ukraine and how that same measure of effectiveness could be accounted for in current doctrine.

Research Design

This qualitative analytical case study research is designed to determine the effectiveness of the experience of the Ukrainian insurgency during and after WWII. This study involves the period from the birth of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, through the activities during the German invasion and occupation, and then the Soviet Union invasion and occupation.

The qualitative analytical case study method of research is the most appropriate tool for this research. Having decided upon the measure of effectiveness by which to evaluate the insurgency, the author gives examples taken from historical sources, to illustrate the mentioned effectiveness. Applying this measure of effectiveness into each of the war fighting functions, the author induces from specific examples to general concepts,

finally giving an answer to the question ‘How effective was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army?’ and ‘What were the causes?’

Data Gathering Procedure

The process of gathering information for this research found the author starting from a position of no familiarization with the issue of Ukrainian insurgency to becoming very knowledgeable. The first source the author addressed was the official Web-site of the Liberation Movement Research Center, which contains a large number of links to publications and archive materials about the Ukrainian liberation movement during the first part of the twentieth century, particularly about the UPA. The author, after an analysis of the available materials, selected a number of primary sources, such as the documentaries and the memoirs of the members of the UPA’s leadership. The author intended to narrow the search of reliable materials. As a result, he contacted and interviewed Dr. Petro Potichnyj (PhD), one of the members of the publishing committee of Litopys UPA (the Cronicle of UPA). Petro Potichnyj is a former UPA combatant, who infiltrated through the territory of Communist Czechoslovakia to West Germany in 1947 and immigrated first to the United States, and then to Canada. Currently he lives in Toronto, Canada. During a telephone interview, the author found several sources, which became fundamental for further bibliography.

The next step of the data gathering process was determining the list of bibliographical material for the research. Mainly the literature which was used for this work is described in Chapter 2, “Literature review.” Because of the different focuses of the available documentaries, choosing appropriate sources was a significant concern. Many works about the political aspect of Ukrainian liberation movement focused on

nationalistic propaganda. Because the author was interested in the UPA's experience on the tactical level, he excluded such works from the bibliography. He concentrated on looking for materials which would satisfy the requirements for this research, such as the UPA's doctrinal documents and archive documents from the Soviet, German, Czechoslovak and Polish sites, which for the most part factually depict the UPA's activity.

Then, the measure of effectiveness had to be determined. Examining the Ukrainian insurgency through the periods of German and Soviet occupation, the author's goal was to analyze the UPA's activity during each of the periods according to the measure of effectiveness. Each example of effectiveness is supported by evidential historical examples, across the framework of war fighting functions. Such examples were taken from documentaries or archive files that are absent subjective or impartial views. In this perspective, archive files included German and Soviet documents were very important for evaluating facts objectively.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The OUN-UPA, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists–Ukrainian Insurgent Army, was the most active and decisive player of the nationalistic liberation movement in Ukraine during 1940s-1950s. Because of effective political and military measures, the OUN-UPA resisted the German occupation, and then the Soviet Union for about ten years. However, OUN-UPA was ultimately defeated in early 1950s.

OUN-UPA was an Insurgent Organization

According Stuart Lyon, an insurgent group is a non-state group engaged in seizing control of part or all of one or more states in order to establish a counter-state. The group's cause connects that counter-state with the people's grievances, needs, and issues using identity, ideology, religion or a combination of them. The group has political and armed components and employs methods including mobilization, subversion, information warfare, negotiations, and violence.¹ Indeed, the OUN-UPA was a non-state organization, attempting to overthrow foreign invaders, e.g. Polish, Czechoslovakian, Romanian and Soviet Russian authorities throughout the territories, populated by ethnic Ukrainians, in order to establish independent state of Ukraine. The end state, gaining independence, was the many-century old desire of the Ukrainian population to oust foreign invaders and live in own independent state. The declaration of the II Great Conference of Ukrainian Nationalists, issued in August 1939, stated:

There is no State of Ukraine yet, but it is alive. As the idea and a combat motto, it is living in our hearts, and realizing that idea is the responsibility, honor, and dignity of each Ukrainian. Once we owned Eastern Europe. The Kievan Rus, Duchy of Galicia–Volhynia and Hetman State of Bohdan Khmelnytsky left us

their honor traditions. Drawing in the tragic greatness of our historical past the power for reviving the nation, the current leader of Ukrainian liberation, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, rose to destroy all occupations and to build Ukrainian state.²

The OUN-UPA Political Wing—Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

The OUN-UPA had a political wing—the OUN, or Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. However, in the context of OUN-UPA, the OUN has to be considered as OUN(B) (Bandera, the name of the leader) or OUN(R) (Revolutionary), political group, headed by Stepan Bandera, which evolved from the initially established OUN in 1940. The evolution came about because of significant differences in prominent philosophies of two OUN groups. One, PUN (Provid of Ukrainian Nationalists) or OUN(M), headed by the OUN Commandant, Andriy Melnyk, relied on external assistance, particularly German, in gaining independence. The other group, OUN(B), headed by young western Ukrainian radical politician, Stepan Bandera, rejected any alliance with those countries, who did not recognize Ukraine as an independent sovereign state.

In February 1940, the Revolutionary Provid (e.g. Leadership) of OUN, headed by former Commander of the OUN Homeland Executive in Western Ukraine, Stepan Bandera, separated from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. As one of the participants of those events wrote, “Two OUNs appeared instead of the one, and started to annihilate each other. That mutual struggle was the biggest negative aspect of the split. The struggle weakened the OUN’s influence among Ukrainians.”³ Bandera himself in his autobiography “My Life Stories” explained the reasons, which caused the split in the OUN. The split happened during his meeting with the Commandant of OUN, Andriy Melnik, in Rome, January 1940. During several conversations, Melnik did not agree with the propositions from representatives of the young generation, delegates from the

Western Ukraine. First of all, he refused to release from the OUN Command two of its members, Y. Baranovskiy and O. Senyk-Grybovskiy, who were suspected to be cooperating with the Polish police. Second and most important, as Bandera wrote, “he rejected our request to not link with Germany the planning of revolutionary-liberation anti-Bolshevik struggle, to make the struggle independent of German military plans.” During those conversations A. Melnyk responded, that increasing OUN activity in Ukrainian territories early is not wise. Instead, they should wait on someone else to take the initiative.⁴ This sticking point of their negotiations had a critical importance for future events.

Not succeeding in his negotiations with Melnik and his followers, S. Bandera and his adherents, the most prominent of whom was Yaroslav Stetsko, created the Revolutionary Provid of OUN. In that way, they emphasized the principal difference in the organization’s views on the liberation struggle compared to the old conservative generation of the OUN. He and his followers, wanted to act using revolutionary methods and to achieve their desired end state, that of gaining Ukrainian independence, in the shortest possible way. Ukrainian independence had to occur as a result from an inner explosion, a peoples’ uprising in Ukraine, prepared by the active organization and propaganda of the OUN, without regard to foreign factors or support.

However, Bandera and his adherents did not reject the idea of receiving help from abroad. Aware of the probable German-Soviet conflict, all Ukrainian political parties attempted to clarify the German intent regarding the Ukrainian independence. With this purpose in mind, the OUN(B) representative V. Stahiv sent a note to the foreign policy department of the Nazi Party, but did not get an answer. Thus, on the second day of the

German-Soviet War, Bandera's OUN sent to the German Imperial office a memorandum which stressed that the fate of the German attack on the East depends on the positive solution of the Ukrainian problem, the establishing of the Ukrainian State, which supports "Germany in the struggle against Bolshevism." The proclamation was the most decisive, made to the Third Reich by representatives of the organized Ukrainian community. The proclamation's tone caused a negative reaction in the German government. One of the consequences of this proclamation was that on June 29, 1941 the Germans prohibited Bandera from leaving his residence in Krakow. When the Act of Declaration of the Ukrainian State was passed on June 30, 1941, Bandera, the leader of Revolutionary Provid, was escorted to Berlin. During July-August 1941 in the capital of the Reich, the fruitless debate concerning the Declaration Act of June, 30 continued between Bandera's adherents and the German representatives. However those debates did not achieve any positive results. In mid-September 1941, the Nazis put Bandera and his associates under house arrest. In 1942, German authorities jailed them in a special section of the Zachsenhausen concentration camp, with other political internees from countries occupied by Germany.

Shortly after the break of Bandera's group from PUN, Revolutionary Command declared "The Manifesto of the Ukrainian Nationalists," which can be considered as the outline of future actions. The Manifesto called for a struggle "for liberation of the Ukrainian people and all other people oppressed by Moscow," and stressed that all Ukrainians have to join the fighting - the Ukrainian National Revolution waged by the OUN under the leadership of Bandera.⁵

In April 1941, at the II Great Conference of the OUN(B), OUN(B) leadership actually refused to unify all Ukrainian political parties and wings in a consolidated front, and again took irreconcilable position regarding “Ukrainian opportunist parties,” as well as the Communists and Komsomol members of Ukrainian origin.

With the II Great Conference, the OUN(B) in fact declared outright war on opponents among the PUN. In a “decision concerning Eng. A. Melnyk,” Colonel A. Melnyk was excluded from OUN membership and forbidden from conducting “any action under the name of OUN.” This applied to the other Melnyk PUN members as well if they did not obey the regulations of the II Great Conference. Every deviation from these regulations OUN would be treated and punished as “acts of sabotage.”

Although the split in the nationalist movement considerably weakened his position at the time, the split called to life the active and dynamic forces of the Ukrainian Nationalists, whose activities are the brightest and most dramatic of the struggle for an independent Ukraine in the twentieth century.

The OUN-UPA Armed Wing—the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

The OUN-UPA had an armed wing, the UPA or Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Officially established in October 1942, UPA significantly increased in early 1943. During the first months of 1942, among all the groups of organized Ukrainians, who hailed German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the opposition to the German policy began to rise. Described in German sources, this opposition was known as “Ukrainian resistance.” The main forces of the anti-Nazi resistance were Bandera’s OUN, adherents of T. Bulba-Borovets, and radical elements of Melnyk’s PUN. The forms of their fight differed because of different political views of those organizations, particularly on

relations with Germany. At the beginning of 1942, all participants of the Ukrainian resistance determined in general their positions, intents and end states regarding German policy. Despite Melnyk's OUN and Bulba-Borovets' insurgent formation emphasis on their opposition to the occupation authorities, they, according to the UPA Commander R. Shuhevych, "wanted to solve the Ukrainian problem within the frame of the German political system." Such views also were shared by other Ukrainian political groups, who kept the principles of collaboration, in the Reichskommissariat, as well as in Galicia.

The OUN(B) was the most decisively opposed to the German occupational regime and from the middle of 1942, started to prepare for armed resistance in case favorable circumstances arose. Bandera's people agreed to collaborate with the Germans in the context of fighting against the Bolsheviks; but just as partners with equal rights, rejecting any kind of dependence on the Third Reich. Concerning the Soviet Union, all participants of the Ukrainian resistance were unanimously agreed about necessity of defeating the USSR.

The spring of 1942 was not promising the quiet life to the Germans. By July 22, 1942, because of bright victories in Kharkov and Crimea, the Germans occupied the whole territory of Ukraine. However, armed resistance to the German occupational forces gradually grew and took much more organized and violent forms.

In early 1942, the first armed detachments of the OUN(B), or so called "boyivky," were organized in Volyn and Polessie. According to a former regional OUN leader in Bukovina, "Motrya" (A. Galytska), such activities, ordered by the OUN(B) Provid, were conducted from the beginning of 1942. The task was to organize every three villages as a

“shrub” (15-45 armed combatants), create mobile company-size unit in every county, and a battalion-size unit, consisting of three-four companies, in every district.⁶

During that stage of preparation to the future uprising, Bandera’s organization concentrated its main efforts on training personnel. Training was systematically conducted from autumn of 1941 with emphasis on the storage of weapons and other military equipment. One of the examples is the order of the OUN(B) county leader “Igor” to the village leaders, dated by the May 22, 1942. The order tasked the leaders to collect weapons among respective territories in two weeks and to pass those weapons to the OUN military advisors.⁷ Deciding to gather and concentrate weapons was also caused by the necessity of preventing occasional independent, uncoordinating acts against Germans.

In the mid-summer of 1942, the total strength of the OUN(B) combat detachments in Volyn and Polessie was about six hundred people.⁸ However, they acted very carefully, using necessary covert measures and trying to avoid engagements with Germans. One of the reports of the Red partisans stated, that during beginning of 1942 within the region of the Rovno, nationalistic detachments with the strength from 50 to 300 troops were formed. They acted covertly. From June of 1942 their activity became more visible, but was directed generally on the storage of food. At the same time, Bandera’s members often masqueraded as Soviet partisans.⁹

There is significant information about the military activities of the OUN(B), mentioned in the “Insurgent Diary” (Kiev, 1993) of the Melnyk’s member “Blakytyniy” (M. Danylyuk). In his report to his leadership in Volyn, dated by September 30, 1942, he wrote, that OUN(B) commanders in the district Dubno-Kreminets “Kruk” (I. Klymishyn) and “Chernyk” “do not even think about an open fight by the detachments. They orient

on small units in cities and villages, and in some occasions, on subversions, assassinations, but with significant limitations.”

After WWII, M. Lebed wrote, that in the summer of 1942 “occasionally, small unit engagements with German forces” took place. However, according to him, those fights were not large or loud, so as to not reveal the origin of the resistance.¹⁰ It proves, that Bandera’s organization did not want to reveal to the Germans their readiness for armed struggle.

However, in mid-summer 1942, postponing an armed uprising against the Nazis obviously would be difficult. Postponement would be difficult not just because of increasing activities of the communist partisans, but also because the German leadership’s and soldiers’ behavior, was increasingly harsh and criminal which caused frequent eruptions of violence throughout the whole Ukrainian territory. Particularly, in Volyn and Polessie the local population attempted to disrupt the deportation and enslavement of laborers to Germany. Those actions, conducted by locals, German authorities considered as open defiance to German policy and authority. Because of that, on May 20, 1942, Reichscommissar of Ukraine Erich Koch, in order to maintain “German authority,” ordered the burning of the property of “unruly locals” and the conduct of any “necessary punishments.” During 1941-1944, the Germans burned 97 villages in Volyn, which was more than in any other region of Ukraine.¹¹

This and other directives, issued by Koch, received wide publicity. As a result, he became the most odious personality among the German occupation administration. Alexander Dallin, a U.S. leading scholar in the field of Soviet Union and East European studies, wrote, Koch incited the Ukrainian population against Germany more than

anybody else.¹² Koch's faults are obvious. However, he simply was the most diligent and consistent executer of the higher Nazi leadership's policy.

At the end of March, 1942, Fritz Sauckel, the official responsible for the replacement of forced or slave labor, sent to the Reichscommissars of Ukraine and Ostland, A. Rosenberg, a letter, requesting to "increase the enslavement by all possible measures."¹³ On March 16, 1942, Rosenberg sent to Hitler a report, trying to turn Hitler's attention to the situation in Ukraine. The report stated that the imprudent policy of the occupation administration has caused the population despair and pushes the population to the point of armed resistance. Because of that, the German military leadership asked the occupation authorities to take measures to control the local population in order to prevent sabotage activities, organization of armed formations etc. Regarding this concern, Rosenberg asked Hitler to issue a directive, making the German policy more humane which would support the success of German interests in Ukraine.¹⁴ However, Rosenberg did not get a positive response to his report.

At the same time, the robbing of material sources, particularly the mass replacement of German food supplies significantly increased. Hitler explained his position regarding this issue most decisively. He considered Ukraine as an unlimited source of food supply for Germany. Prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, on June 21, 1941, in his letter to Mussolini, Hitler wrote that he is going to establish a fundamental long-term food supply in Ukraine that would be needed for the Reich in the future.¹⁵

The replacement of laborers from Ukraine was caused by enlarging the requirement for military production for the war against the Soviet Union. During the meeting of Nazi higher leadership in Berlin, on September 4, 1942, Fritz Sauckel directly

stated, that using Eastern labor will “enable the continued program of increasing steel production, determined as necessary by Hitler for realizing his plans in the West and the future defeat of the most powerful Western state—the United States.”¹⁶ Thus, Koch had a difficult task: send to Germany by March 31, 1942, 225 thousand laborers, and then, by May 1, 225 thousand more. The replacements were found and shipped using very severe methods. In his letter to Sauckel, Rosenberg wrote: “Reports, which I have received, show that the increase of partisan activities in occupied territories is explained by the fact, that our methods of obtaining slave labor replacements are violent methods of mass captivity. Thus, the people are forced to avoid capture and their only option is that of escaping to the woods and joining the partisans.”¹⁷

However, OUN(B) leadership strictly prohibited any actions against the German occupation forces. Such an OUN(B) tactic could be understood, because OUN(B)’s main intent was to protect its organizational cells in any way, to gain time for gathering forces and store resources. Such an OUN(B) position had shortfalls. The leadership’s effort to postpone an armed uprising against the Germans in such circumstances, when an uprising was inevitable, was not appreciated by the regular members. As Petro Mirchuk mentioned, “already in the spring of 1942, OUN faced demands from the members for a national armed uprising.”¹⁸

OUN(B) faced a dilemma. On one hand they needed to protect the population. On the other hand they needed to postpone open uprising in order to gather men and equipment. No longer able to avoid an open uprising, OUN(B) began the process of forming its own armed forces, which very soon took the name of Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

The first UPA detachment was organized in Polessie in October of 1942. Because of the strong religious beliefs of the Western Ukrainian population, UPA insurgents timed the birth of the UPA to coincide with the Orthodox Christian celebration of Intercession of the Theotokos, and still today, in addition to the religious context, this date is celebrated in Ukraine as UPA Day.

The Organization of the UPA

The UPA soon began to reflect the make-up of the whole nation, welcoming everyone and uniting members of different political movements. All members focused on creating an Independent Ukraine. Growing from the combat detachments of OUN(B), the UPA, especially from the beginning, was closely tied to the OUN(B) organizational structure. Because of those ties, the leadership positions of the UPA were occupied by OUN(B) leaders. The main task of the UPA during the first period was not that of defeating the Germans, but that of protecting of the population from the German occupation regime. Because of that, each UPA unit was tied to a specific administrative territory. The territorial principle was the fundamental basis of the UPA task organization.¹⁹

The UPA was divided into four groups: UPA-North, including Volyn and Polessie; UPA-West, including Galicia, Bukovina, Zakarpatska and part of Lvov regions; UPA-South, including regions of Kamyanets-Podolsky, Zhytomir, Vinnitsa and part of Kiev region; and UPA-East, including north parts of Zhytomir, Kiev and Chernigov regions. Each of the groups was divided into Military Districts (MD), and each of them was respectively divided into Tactical Sectors (TS)²⁰ (see figure 1).




Figure 1. UPA areas of operation during 1943-1944

Source: Created by author from Google Earth, <http://maps.google.com.ua/maps?hl=uk&tab=wl> (accessed 15 February 2012), ПетроМірчук [Petro Mirchuk], *Українська Повстанська Армія: 1942-1952* [Ukrainian Insurgent Army: 1942-1952] (Munich: Cicero, 1953), 233-234.

The main tactical unit of the UPA was known as the *kurin* (battalion size unit), which consisted of three to four *sotnya* (company size unit) with additional support units. Each *sotnya* consisted of three rifle and one machinegun *chota* (platoon size unit). Each *chota* consisted of three *roy* (section size units). According UPA field regulations, the strength of each *sotnya* was 136 troops, but in fact those units were manned with 130-200 troops. In UPA-South and UPA-West, the *kurin* was the largest combat sustainable unit, and in case of an urgent necessity several of *kurin* could be task organized in to an *operational group*. In UPA-North the largest operational unit was a *zagin* (detachment, brigade size unit), which consisted of three to four *kurins*.²¹ (see figure 2).




Figure 2. UPA Task organization during 1943-1944

Source: Created by author data from ПетроМірчук[Petro Mirchuk], *УкраїнськаПовстанськаАрмія: 1942-1952 [Ukrainian Insurgent Army: 1942-1952]* (Munich: Cicero, 1953), 233-235.

For command and control, the UPA Supreme Command was established. The UPA Supreme Command was composed of the Supreme Commander, Deputy Supreme Commander and General Military Staff. The General Military Staff consisted of the following directorates: Operations, Intelligence, Logistics, Training, Information (propaganda), and Political Education. Each of the four UPA groups, was headed by a UPA group commander with an area Military Staff, which had a structure identical to the General Military Staff structure. Battalion and company size unit's headquarters had fewer personnel. They consisted of a battalion (company) commander, deputy commander, commander's adjutant, deputy commander for propaganda and doctor, or nurse. All the above was the doctrinal template of the UPA task organization and

command and control system. Each of the UPA groups, battalions and companies had minor deviations as appropriate.²²

The first fights against the Germans significantly inspired the local population of Volyn and Polessie. The local population massively joined the UPA. From the beginning of 1943 recruitment increased the UPA fighting strength significantly. In March 1943, many Ukrainian auxiliary police units deserted from German service and joined the UPA, which also significantly enlarged the organization.²³ Recruitment to the UPA was based on the principal of voluntary enlistment. However, there were several attempts to provide general mobilization of all combat effective members of the local population, but implementation of those plans was precluded by the nature of the insurgent warfare. An example of the failure of such mobilization is the forced organization of a UPA battalion, conducted by a chief of operations of one UPA battalion, “Yurchenko” in 1944 in the vicinity of Hrubieszów. The newly organized battalion, suffered heavy casualties, and was defeated during its first engagement, with all personnel scattered. “Yurchenko” was captured by the NKVD, and betrayed the unit. Before OUN security service members neutralized him, “Yurchenko” disclosed to the NKVD several UPA safe havens and clandestine cells. Because insurgent warfare required a war against an overwhelming adversary and required an outstanding level of courage and devotion, just the ones who did not fear complete self-sacrifice for the victory, could be effective as an UPA combatant.²⁴

Not just Ukrainians served in the UPA. According to one point of the OUN(B) political program, to collaborate with all nations, suppressed by the Soviet Union,²⁵ UPA leadership started to organize multinational units beginning in 1943. The inspiration of

creating the multinational formations within the UPA was the young writer Yosyp Pozychanyuk (“Shugay-Shablyk”), who held the position of chief of political-propagandist cell in the UPA Supreme Command. The practical implementer of this concept was Major Dmytro Karpenko (“Hawk”), a former Red Army officer. Multinational units were organized at battalion and company echelons; each battalion was task organized within a UPA (mostly ethnically Ukrainian) regiment. Each company subordinated to the UPA battalion along the same principle. The first multinational battalion was organized in UPA-North in 1943 by Uzbeks, headed by the Major “Tashkent” (real name is unknown), who was captured by the Soviets in March 1944 and was shot. Shortly after Uzbeks, also within UPA-North, Georgian and Armenian battalions and a company of immigrants from Kuban were formed. The Azeri battalion was also organized in UPA-North. The number of multinational units during the middle of 1944 was fifteen battalions. Other nationalities, such as Austrians, Belgians, French, Germans, Yugoslavs, did not have their separate units, but fought alongside Ukrainian formations, or they occupied administrative or staff positions. An attempt to create a Russian unit failed. The Russian company, manned mostly with former Red Army officers and NCOs, was formed in Military District “Zagrava” (UPA-North) in 1943. The company fought against the Germans, and even was recognized by the UPA leadership as a result of their extraordinary courage. However, frequent conflict with other units and individual UPA members, mostly caused by ethnic tensions, forced the UPA Supreme Command to disband this Russian company.²⁶

The OUN-UPA Effectively Operated Politically

The OUN(B), as a political component of the OUN-UPA, effectively executed their political campaign. All efforts of that campaign were focused on infiltration of the enemy's institutions in order to increase OUN-UPA intelligence, protection, and logistic capabilities. Simultaneously with the start of German-Soviet War, OUN(B) leadership, as well as their political opponents, approved the concept of "marching groups," which was to move to the Eastern Ukrainian lands and establish Ukrainian administration.

While the higher level politicians discussed the issue of Ukraine's future in anticipation of the German invasion, the "marching groups" of both OUN wings moved, following the Wehrmacht, to the East. They had the task, while providing assistance to the Germans in organizing administration among the Ukrainian lands liberated from Soviet, to establish the fundamental structure for the future Ukrainian government. According to one German document, OUN "marching groups," "concealed the carrying out the tasks of maintaining order, such as: the appointment of Mayor, or the police struggle with the Jews and Communists," and also conducted their own political activities.²⁷

One of the OUN(M) members, O. Zhdanovych ("Shtul"), briefly formulated the overall goal of "marching" groups of both factions of the OUN: "It was clear that the German-Soviet war requires from us quick and decisive action with a purpose to build up our positions for the further war at the moment of confusion, when new occupation force is not stationary yet."²⁸

UPA historian and participant of those events, Lev Shankovskiy, stated "marching" groups were a kind of political army.²⁶ OUN(B) groups had about five

thousand members. German military commanders appointed members of the “marching” groups to leadership positions in regional, city and district councils, economic, cultural and educational institutions, which were created in the occupied territories and gave them the right to organize Ukrainian police and use them as interpreters.

The tragic cause, that weakened whole Ukrainian liberation movement, was disagreement and struggle among themselves; their incapability to find compromise and unify themselves around one main end state. Open conflict arose between “marching” groups from both OUN wings from beginning of their activities. OUN(B) members tried to not allow their opponents to move forward, to hold them at the border. With this purpose they left so called “garrisons” in strategic areas. As OUN(M) member S. Kasian remembered, Bandera’s leadership strictly ordered the personnel of those “garrisons” to stop Melnyk’s men; if necessary, by force, do not hesitate to shoot, because Melnyk's men are traitors of the OUN.”²⁹ The advantage was on Bandera’s side. Supported by the German Army authorities, Bandera’s people acted much more effectively than their competitors. They boldly coordinated with German soldiers and the Germans moved them on German military transports, leaving Melnyk’s members behind. Without any thoughts or hesitation, OUN(B) members started to organize local governments, regardless of the position of the other Ukrainian political forces. They did not want to wait for someone else’s favor. They tried to act selflessly and enthusiastically.

The leaders of organized Ukrainians, moving with the Germans against the Soviet Union, could not tolerate each other. Instead of working together, they chose armed struggle and mutual discrediting attack; willing first of all to assert themselves and disparage an opponent. Everybody fought against everyone. In a letter addressed to the

Hetman of Ukrainian Free Cossacks, dated by July 1941, one of his leaders, sent to found their own organizational net in districts of Volodymyr-Volynskiy, Gorohiv, Dubno, Zdolbuniv, Rivne and Kostopil (mostly the territory of current Rivne region), described OUN members' behavior regarding their opponents. "The orientation of Bandera's men is extremely hostile. I have to share the sad message, that our sworn-brother Zagorovskiy is no longer alive. He was assassinated by Bandera's terrorist cell. Investigation is underway. Nor lives sworn-brother Vasyl Tyuba from Kovel, who crossed the border together with me and left in the county of Gorohiv, where he was killed by Bandera's people."³⁰

The OUN(M) members also attempted to discredit their opponents from Bandera's wing. When K. Radzevych within one of the Melnyk's "marching" group came to Fastiv (current Kiev region), the commandant of Ukrainian police, Bandera's member, wrote a "false accusation about Melnyk's members, intended to neutralize them in such way."³¹

The assassination of O. Senyk-Grybovskiy and M. Sciborskiy, two leading figures of A. Melnyk organization, on August 30, 1941 in occupied by Germans Zhitomyr, received a great deal of publicity. In the leaflet, called "Ukrainians," published in early September 1941, Melnyk's people called Bandera's people "Cain-fratricides" in reference to the assassination. To pester his opponents more, Melnyk emphasized that "the assassination was organized by the enemies of Ukraine, first of all, by Moscow."

However, the assassinations were only the first of many killings. OUN(M) accused the supporters of OUN(B) of turning over to the Germans the famous poet, and member of Melnyk's wing, Olena Teliha, and then Oleh Olzhych, the leader of Melnyk's

“marching” groups. Both Teliha and Olzhych were executed by the Gestapo.³² Bandera’s Organization also was accused in the murder of two leading member of the PUN, R. Sushko and Y. Baranovskiy, and in the murder of the wife of T. Bulba-Borovets, the warlord of the rebel formation in Volyn. The OUN(B) presented counter-claims concerning Melnyk’s people eliminated Bandera’s personnel. Some researches indicate that Bandera’s people killed about four thousands of OUN(M) members. Also, Melnyk’s supporters ostensibly killed thousands of supporters of Stepan Bandera.³³

Conflicts among Ukrainian political organizations are not the only activities that weakened the OUN. The Nationalists also faced the challenge of an ideological struggle in Eastern Ukrainian territories, which had to be the main area of operations for the “marching” groups. In this area, the decisive battle between nationalist and communist ideologies had to take place. However, the OUN would suffer a setback. Too often the locals considered the “marching” groups’ to be members of the German Army, dressed as Ukrainians and speaking the Ukrainian language. Despite their loud slogans and appeals, OUN members mostly were unable to answer the most sensitive political and social-economic questions, such as land distribution. They particularly failed to find any understanding with youths, raised in Communist spirit.

According to one OUN(B) analytical paper, “generally, at the beginning of the German campaign (summer of 1941) the OUN seemed to Eastern Ukrainians, and even to the lower OUN membership, as a force, which found or is looking for allies with the Germans in struggle against Bolshevism. Very few of the Eastern Ukraine citizens properly understood the revolutionary focus of the OUN efforts and the inevitable clash with Hitler’s Germany.”³⁴

At the same time, according to the former member of “marching” groups and historian L. Shankovskiy, despite all difficulties, the “Ukrainian nationalist underground in Central and Eastern Ukrainian lands won the ideological “competition” against Bolshevik underground,” and “the people well understood and accepted the nationalists’ political calls to fight against occupiers.”³⁵

However, Shankovskiy’s statements are far from reality. At that time the OUN(B) did not call for a fight against the Nazis yet, and considered the main OUN(B) goal as “to pull out our society from the Bolsheviks’ influence and include our society in the nationalist camp.” Members of the “marching” groups had serious difficulties in carrying out the simple tasks of explaining their programs in Central and Eastern Ukraine. These information operations lapses were explained by the lack of those members’ professional training, which was often limited by incomplete primary education, and unexpectedly high level of political awareness of the people in Eastern Ukraine. As a result, according L. Shankovskiy, the “marching” groups members “quite soon were losing the motivation to continue conducting information operations and propaganda work.”

However, despite the setbacks, the “marching” groups of both OUN wings conducted significant organizational and propagandist work in Eastern Ukraine with a purpose to direct the locals to the OUN’s side; to include them to the struggle for Ukrainian state independence. Good results came from this direction. In a short period the OUN managed to establish cells almost in all Eastern regions, including the Donbass (current regions of Donetsk and Lugansk). In October 1941, some of “marching” groups’ members went to Crimea, where they founded the “Ukrainian National Committee,” which became the Ukrainian administration in the peninsula.

However, all those OUN cells appeared mostly organizationally fragile and not ideologically strong enough. Some of them, including the biggest cells in Kyiv and Dnepropetrovsk, were uncovered by Germans, and, then during 1943-1945, destroyed by the Soviet NKVD. The underground nationalist organizations, established by the OUN(B) in Central and Eastern Ukraine, significantly differed from underground cells in Western Ukraine. First of all, they were manned with the locals, who did not undergo ideological training, and their outlook was closer to the democratic nationalism of the time of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1918. Moreover, sometimes they were former communists. Also, those cells did not accept the main principle of the OUN—the principle of autocracy. Lastly, the members of cells worked, mainly, legally in organizations, supported by the Germans, and were well-known to the public. Because they did not work covertly, they easily became victims of punitive units.

Both Melnyk's and Bandera's wings sent east their "marching" groups. However, only Bandera's had significant success. The opponents also had to recognize that. The activist of the OUN(M) Z. Knysh wrote, that "Bandera's wing was tied with German military authorities by any kind of promises, and, because of intelligence and sabotage activities in the Soviet rear, gained the favor of German intelligence units," which contributed to the OUN(B) success in comparison with their competitors from Melnyk's wing.³⁶

The first steps of the "marching" groups did not escape the Soviet authorities' attention. Thus, in the South-Western Front rear protection Commander's directive, issued on July 20, 1941, mentioned "nationalist-emissaries," who were dropped behind the front line to form subversive groups. During September-November 1941, Special and

Intelligence departments of the Southern Front issued a situational report concerning the regions of Ukraine, occupied by Germans. That report emphasized the activity of Ukrainian Nationalists, who arrived from Western Ukraine. Although those documents identified Nationalists as German “servants,” they stressed, that Nationalists criticize the Bolshevik regime, widely propagate the OUN program and the idea of independence. That document also mentioned, that the Nationalists are very successful in creating local administration, police, publication press, and in realm of religion.³⁷

The most significant achievement of the OUN(B) as a political wing after the Soviet Union reestablished control over the Ukrainian territories, was the development of three main lines of effort, so called “tactical schemes,” which enabled OUN(B) to adapt to the new overwhelming adversary, and save OUN’s potential for further struggle.

During 1945-1946, the OUN-UPA leadership (R. Shuhevych, V. Kuk, V. Sydor, P. Fedun and others) developed three lines of effort (LOE, which received code names “Dazhbog,” “Oleh” and “Orlyk.” The main one among them was the LOE Dazhbog, which determined the fundamental activities in the new environment, aimed at disruption of Sovietization. The LOE envisaged: (1) securing cadres by the way of legalization, and minimization of open fights; (2) integrating covert cadres to the Soviet administration, in preparation for the probable overthrow of the legitimate government; (3) disruption in any way the process of collectivization; (4) increasing the conspiracy and disinformation the enemy about real OUN-UPA strength and intents. Dazhbog emphasized such principles, mentioned above, as security, creating the system of bunkers network, and establishing the covert lines of communication. Special attention was given to building the “legal network”—groups or individual supporters, who lived legally, and could create

the support for the clandestine network within the legitimate administration, collective farms, enterprises, educational institutions, and transportation and communication facilities. The cadres of the legal network were encouraged to enter to the Communist Party and Comsomol. During 1945-1947, the legal network covered almost whole country areas of the Western Ukraine. In support of the establishment of the legal network: during 1950 and until March, 1951, just in the region of Ivano-Frankovsk 103 legal network cells were operational, 69 of them—in collective farms, 7—in educational facilities, 10—in lumber industry, and 19 others. Those cells included 677 members; 7 of them were heads of collective farms, 56—collective farms chair committees, 53—teachers, 40—collective farms administrators, 35—Comsomol members, 8—auxiliary police members, 84—pupils and students.³⁸ Switching to the clandestine activities according Dazhbog LOE allowed the OUN-UPA to recuperate itself fast even after crucial losses, caused during the “Great blockade.” According to the NKVD summary of the counterinsurgency activities in western regions of Ukrainian SSR during eleven months of 1946, OUN conducted 53 combat actions during March, in April—159, in May—218, and in July—235.³⁹

The tactical scheme “Oleh” was designed to educate youths and prepare them for the revolutionary struggle. The scheme assigned such main tasks as: (1) develop the mechanism of selection of young cadres; (2) educate youths in nationalist and national-patriotic spirit; (3) train them in different fundamental techniques (organizational, conspiracy, propagandist, intelligence, saboteurs etc.) of struggle legal and clandestine environment; (4) manage activities of youth’s organizations network.

OUN-UPA increased the covert positions from several hundred to two thousand youths annually. Avoiding conscription into the Red Army or on the forced labor facilities in the eastern regions of the Soviet Union, a lot of them were deployed in active forms of resistance. The Soviet law enforcements units' statistics show the vim of the youth organizations network, controlled by OUN-UPA: during 1948-1949, NKVD units revealed in Western Ukraine 561 youth organizations' cells (6,405 members), from January 1 to September 1, 1959–335 cells (2,488 members, 340 items of weapons).⁴⁰

Finally, the tactical scheme “Orlyk” (another name–“Kharkov”) focused on spreading the OUN influence among eastern and southern territories of Ukraine. According to Soviet law enforcement information, OUN covert cells continued to act in eastern regions of Ukraine during 1946. During that period there were 80 terrorist acts, 12 subversions, 234 attacks on collective farms and mechanic stations, 455 armed robberies.⁴¹ The main tasks of that scheme were: (1) establishing the organizational network and cadre reserve in mentioned regions; (2) starting there propaganda and intelligence activities; (3) propagandist and polling activities among workers, sent from the eastern Ukrainian regions.

Because of heavy losses, the “Orlyk” LOE was facing failure during late 1940s. In 1948, the OUN-UPA Supreme Commander, R. Shuhevych, made decision to form groups of experienced covert cadres, who fluently spoke Russian, and were culturally astute. In close coordination with OUN supporters in Eastern Ukraine, those groups had to establish clandestine cells, conduct propaganda and intelligence in Eastern Ukraine.⁴²

The OUN-UPA Effectively Operated Militarily

UPA effectively executed armed activities. However, the activities were different under German and Soviet occupations. During the period of German occupation, all UPA efforts were directed at establishing control throughout the territory of Ukraine (at least, where UPA acted) in order to disrupt the German occupational regime, protect the population against Nazi tyranny, and protect the UPA itself in order to save the potential for the further struggle against the winner of the Soviet-German war. The UPA units did not fight with the regular German forces. Obviously, one of the reasons was that since 1941, the German-Soviet front moved further East from the territories of Western Ukraine, where UPA acted. However, even when the Germans withdrew in 1944, UPA units engaged them only in case of extreme necessity, in self-defense. The UPA leadership adhered to the concept of using every measure to protect their own forces and the local population, but to not weaken the German's military potential in order to assist defeat of the Soviet Union. That is why the major UPA adversaries were Nazi punitive forces (SS units and auxiliary police) and Red partisans. Both the Red partisans and the UPA insurgents, tried to maintain a balanced neutrality and to not fight each other. To emphasize the anti-Soviet nature of Ukrainian insurgency, most modern researchers try to discount or refute any thoughts about probable collaboration between UPA and Soviet partisans. However, UPA units, in fact, did not fight against Red partisans during 1942 or 1943.⁴³

All deliberate military actions were aimed to create the atmosphere of fear and uncertainty among the German occupation authorities, protect the local population in order to ensure the support of the population, and to enlarge sustainment capabilities. The

main forms of attack were small unit attack, ambush, assassination, and subversion. The objects of the attacks were the offices of the German administration, stations of auxiliary police, prisons where the Germans kept Ukrainians, logistical storage sites, and, after 1943, operational bases of Red partisans. UPA units also continued to ambush German convoys with the purpose to collect more weapons, ammunition and equipment.

The first significant fight between UPA and German auxiliary police was the UPA Company sized attack on the town of Volodymyrec (region of Rovno), in February 7, 1943. Enemy casualties were 7 troops killed and on the UPA side—one killed and two wounded.⁴⁴ During early April 1943, because of successful armed actions, UPA detachments liberated from German authorities the regions of Ternopol and Rovno. All German administration, auxiliary police, and Gestapo functionaries were destroyed during those actions. Several days later, the Germans transferred to Ternopol and Rovno one punitive division, which consisted of two Hungarian regiments, one regiment of SS, one regiment of auxiliary police, and one regiment of captured Russians, who joined the German side. The division was tasked to suppress the uprising in the Ternopol and Rovno regions. After a three-day fight, the punitive division was defeated with casualties of about two hundred killed and wounded.⁴⁵ Just during July–September 1943, UPA detachments conducted 74 engagements with German forces and their allies. In Summer 1943, German military authorities attempted to destroy the UPA-North forces again. The Germans deployed 50 tanks and armored vehicles, 27 planes, 10 motorized infantry battalions, and a number of police units. During the operation, several small fights with UPA units occurred, particularly in July–35, in August–24, in September–15. In those fights the UPA lost 1237 officers and troops as killed and wounded. The casualties

among the local population were about five thousand. Germans losses were more than three thousand troops killed and wounded. During October-November 1943, the UPA conducted 47 attacks against the Germans, causing an additional loss of about 1,500 troops on the German side, while incurring a loss of 414 insurgents.⁴⁶ The overall statistics of fights between the Germans and UPA units, and their casualties, is given in table 1.

Table 1. Casualties resulting from the fights between Germans and UPA units								
Territorial locality (region of)		The number of anti-German actions	Germans			UPA insurgents		
			Killed	Wounded	Captured	Killed	Wounded	Captured
Volyn	Rovno	1120	5501	357	859	692	179	206
	Volyn	455	2198	1277	264	754	109	8
	Ternopol	220	905	110	30	253	22	2
Galicia	Ivano-Frankovsk	151	1066	150	524	85	42	3
	Lvov	326	955	25	681	234	81	317
	Ternopol	90	633	11	32	52	23	-
Eastern Ukraine		174	1169	99	58	181	19	-
Total		2526	12427	2047	2448	2251	475	536

Source: Олександр Денишук [Oleksandr Denyshuk], *Боротьба УПА Проти Німецьких Окупантів: том 1, Волинь [The Struggle of UPA Against German Occupants: volume 1, Volyn]* (Rovno: PPDM, 2008), 32.

Despite outlasting the German occupational regime, the UPA faced a bigger threat in the summer of 1944; the return of the overwhelming Soviet military machine, especially, the Soviet punitive units of MVD and NKVD. However, while still operating in the German's rear, the UPA had to infiltrate the German-Soviet front, avoiding fights, and allow the Germans and the Soviets to damage each other as much as possible during the German withdrawal.

In mid-January 1944, the First Ukrainian Front of the Red Army, commanded by General M. Vatutin, successfully conducted a huge offensive operation (*Zhitomyr-Berdichevskaya*). As a result, the Soviets took control over most of central and western Ukraine, particularly, the regions of Kiev, Zhitomir, Vinnitsa and Rovno. In April 1944, Soviet punitive units, which advanced beyond the regular army, concentrated large forces in the area of Shepetovka-Rovno-Zbarazh, and began continuously engaging separate UPA units, mostly in the northern part of UPA-North. About five thousand UPA troops confronted five NKVD brigades, roughly about thirty thousand troops, reinforced with armor, artillery units and army aviation. On April 22-23, 1944, encircled by the Bolshevik forces, UPA defenders attempted to breach the enemy circle, and, suffered heavy casualties. However, they succeeded in breaking through attacking enemy forces on April 25, 1944. The main part of survivors, chased by the NKVD forces, moved northwest, to the areas of Polessie.⁴⁷

UPA-South suffered their biggest loses during the moving of the fronts. Two month-long fights, during which the Soviets supported by NKVD and regular army divisions, with all available fire support, caused such heavy casualties, that the UPA Supreme Command decided to disband UPA-South. One part of UPA-South was task

organized to the UPA-West, another one to the UPA-North. Only some separate UPA-South detachments remained in their respective areas of operation. Within the regions of Zhitomir, Vinnitsa and Kamyanyets-Podilskiy those units operated in suitable terrain, covered by deep woods.

The defeat of UPA-South forced the UPA Supreme Command to change the tactics of the infiltration of the front line. It appeared that large engagements with Red Army units by detachments of several battalions or more were causing too many casualties. That is why, in summer 1944, all UPA detachments received the order to split into not more than company size units, and move to the Carpathian Mountains, or other large forested areas, and split into platoons, or even into squads, in less restrictive terrain. Such changes were justified. Not facing large irregular formations, the Red Army usually did not engage small UPA units. Instead they focused on pursuing the withdrawing German army.⁴⁸

During the first period of the Soviet occupation, from summer 1944 to spring 1945, the main UPA task was to resist the MVD-NKVD punitive actions, to save UPA forces from total destruction, to reestablish and maintain control over their areas of operation, analyze their new enemy and find appropriate techniques to combating their new enemy. In order to ensure popular support, most UPA actions during this initial period were aimed to disrupt the collectivization of the peasants, repatriation of locals from Ukraine to the eastern regions of the Soviet Union, protect the population, and disrupt the establishment of Soviet administration. That is why all UPA activities were mostly direct actions, such as attacks, ambushes, subversions and assassinations, directed

on NKVD units, operational bases, transports, used for the deportation of the local population, political and military leadership, and Communist activists.

According to information from the NKVD General Department of Combating Banditry, during first part of 1945, anti-Soviet resistance in Western Ukraine conducted 2207 direct actions, in particular 212 attacks on the railroads, 11 attacks on district administration cells, 236 attacks on government institutions, 689 terrorist acts and assassinations.⁴⁹

Aiming to destroy Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik armed resistance, and particularly the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, NKVD (renamed in that time to MVD-MGB) applied a new tactic of combating the insurgency—blockades. There were two types of blockades, so called “large” and “small” blockades. Usually, for large blockades, several thousand NKVD, sometimes also regular army, troops were deployed. The concept of such a blockade was to encircle a large forested area, and to comb thoroughly all encircled terrain with the purpose to detect and destroy any insurgent units. Several days prior to a planned large blockade, NKVD units usually conducted punitive actions among the local population, aiming to provoke UPA forces into an engagement and to confirm the UPA location. NKVD units then retreated. After that, larger forces encircled the confirmed terrain and conducted an encircling concentric offense, supported by artillery and aviation. Small blockades were conducted by the forces of not more than one company, after the terrain was searched by the large blockade. The end state of the small blockades was to pursue retreating insurgents, and search for wounded UPA combatants, concealed by the local population.⁵⁰

During the period 1944-1946, because of intensive counterinsurgency operations, by the whole spectrum of Soviet law enforcement machine, OUN and UPA suffered large losses. According to Soviet data, during this period OUN and UPA lost one hundred and thirty thousand (including two thousand leaders) and the Soviets captured forty thousand members of the resistance movement. Obviously, a big portion of those statistics was non-combatants, supporters among local population.⁵¹ The biggest operation, known as “Great blockade,” was carried out from January 11 to April 10, 1946. Almost all towns and villages in primarily western Ukraine were taken under the control of the regular military and interior police units. Mobile groups conducted roundups in restricted, mountainous and forested terrain. For example, just in the region of Stanislav (current Ivano-Frankovsk) 616 groups, 10-15 troops each, cordoned each local area and there was in the region a mobile reserve consisting of 120 operational officers and 2000 soldiers and NCOs. The losses of the insurgents were 1836 killed, 3030 captured and 634 surrendered.⁵² According to different estimates, resistance forces were reduced by 40-60 percent. Generally agreed upon data of insurgents’ losses, given in a report of the NKVD of Ukrainian SSR “About the struggle against the Ukrainian nationalists,” is presented in table 2.

Table 2. Report of Results of Combating Banditry Among the Territories of Western Regions of Ukrainian SSR from February 1944 to May 25, 1946				
	1944	1945	1946	Total
Operations conducted	6,495	33,278	47,798	87,571
Killed bandits and others	57,405	45,907	7,523	110,835
Captured bandits and others	98,641	126,758	25,277	250,676
Bandits surrendered	29,204	79,488	6,157	114,859
Total	185,250	252,153	38,957	476,360

Source: Центральний Державний Архів Громадських Організацій (ЦДАГО), фонд 1, опис 23, справа 2967, аркуш 25 [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine, fund no. 1, inventory no. 23, file no. 2967, 25].

Thus, significant losses, different combat potentials of the fighting sides, the necessity of saving one's own forces, and the need to disrupt Sovietization, combined to cause the UPA to develop new methods of armed resistance. UPA emphasized minimizing combat engagements with enemy forces and securing the UPA organizational structure. All efforts should be directed against the Soviet civil administration and the collectivization efforts.

In the OUN document "About the tactics of revolutionary struggle," dated June, 1946), the new concept was termed "deep clandestine tactic." According to the document, "The current political situation, characterized by a Soviet systematic terror program, conducted by the Bolshevik authorities and "peaceful" international relations, is not appropriate for offensive insurgent activities. The OUN needed to switch to defensive-clandestine tactics, directed on avoiding large combat fights. The task organization, propaganda techniques, combat tactics and sustainment principles need to be changed."⁵³

However, even though UPA accepted new principles of clandestine operations, OUN-UPA did not discount combat actions as a means to defeat the enemy. Sabotage actions were considered as effective to resist the Soviet authorities. Just in the region of Ivano-Frankovsk, from December 30, 1945 to January 4, 1946, one medical and two transport trains were destroyed; during January-February 1946, OUN-UPA conducted 30 acts of sabotage on railway and 20–on industrial targets. The main targets for sabotage became oil industry facilities and oil pipelines. Because of OUN-UPA sabotage activities, Soviet leadership decided to secure twenty one oil industry facilities using the 32nd Division of the Interior Forces NKVD.⁵⁴

According to Soviet data, during 1944-1953, OUN-UPA conducted 14,424 combat actions, 4904 terrorist acts, 195 sabotage acts, 645 attacks on the Soviet administration facilities and collective farms, and 359 armed robberies of government properties. The concept of avoiding large open fights with the Soviet regular military and NKVD units, and creating an atmosphere of fear and terror among the Soviet authorities was effective. In April 1973, 10th Department of KGB USSR issued a report of the casualties of the Soviet side during 1944-1953. According the report, casualties were: Soviet administration authorities on different levels–2,732, Communist functionaries–251, Komsomol members–207, heads of collective farms–314, collective farms members–15,355, industrial workers–676, and intellectuals–1931.⁵⁵

The OUN-UPA ultimately lost during late 1940s–early 1950s

Despite the OUN-UPA seeming recuperation from the punitive actions of 1945-1946, beginning in 1950 the UPA significantly weakened. As a result of the military-punitive operations during 1951-1952, the OUN-UPA clandestine network significantly

slowed down its activity. In contrast to 1950, when Soviet statistics counted 518 actions of resistance (408 people were killed on the Soviet side), during 1951 the number of actions was 189, including 112 assassinations (casualties were 129 people, including 5 NKVD members, 26 police servicemen, 18 auxiliary police fighters, 20 Communist leaders, 14 heads of collective farms).⁵⁶

The last outbreak of terror occurred during 1956-1957. Former OUN-UPA members, coming back from places of imprisonment, conducted 39 attacks (15 killed), 506 acts of assault and battery and 325 other acts of violence on Communists and witnesses. Even during 1961-1962, five thousand unregistered weapons were expropriated from the population of Western Ukraine.⁵⁷

Thus, the primary qualitative question of this research is: Why then did the OUN-UPA officially disband in 1949 after only a short time as an effective force?

Analysis

To answer the question, the McCormick's Theory of COIN was applied. McCormick's "Diamond" model includes four components: insurgent force, COIN forces, popular support, and international community, and describes the interrelations among them. This model gives an understanding of the actions, required for both the insurgent force and the COIN forces for success, and demonstrates how both of them can succeed or fail (see figure 3).




Figure 3. McCormick's "Diamond" Model

Source: Created by author from Gordon H. McCormick, *Guerilla Warfare* (Lecture given at the Naval Postgraduate School, Montgomery, California, 2003)

Each of the elements will have a basic set of interactions with the other elements:

1. Gain Support of the Population
2. Disrupt Opponent's Control Over the Population
3. Direct Action Against Opponent
4. Disrupt Opponent's Relations with the International Community
5. Establish Relationships with the International Community

Each opposing force element attempts to gain support and feedback from the population and international community.

According to McCormick's Theory, insurgencies rarely, if ever, succeed in situations where the insurgents have no support from the international community or where the counterinsurgent is very powerful, resilient, and ruthless. Both situations existed in case of the OUN-UPA. Thus, in the particular case of this research, the

Insurgent Force (e.g. OUN-UPA) is a non-state group engaged using violence to seize control of part or all of one or more states in order to establish a counter-state (e.g. Ukraine). The OUN-UPA cause connected that counter-state with the peoples' grievances, needs, and issues using identity, ideology, religion or a combination of them (e.g. desire to gain political, cultural, religious independence etc.). The OUN-UPA had political (OUN) and armed (UPA) components and employed methods including mobilization, subversion, information warfare, negotiations, and violence.

The counterinsurgency force is the current government or occupying force in the region. In this case the COIN force is the German, and then Soviet governmental forces in the disputed territories.

The Population consists of the inhabitants in the disputed region. In this case, the population is all those inhabitants of the territory, populated with ethnically Ukrainians.

The international community is the set of nation states, international organizations, and other organizations that are outside the disputed territory. In this case the international community consists of Western anti-Nazi states, e.g. the United States, Great Britain, and non-governmental organizations, like Red Cross, etc.

Analysis of the OUN-UPA activities during German period

The OUN-UPA had one significant difference, compared with to insurgencies, like in France, Poland or Yugoslavia. Not having their own recognized nation state at the beginning of the German-Soviet war, the OUN-UPA took the German side in fighting Bolshevism, expecting the tolerance of the German government regarding the issue of an independent state of Ukraine. However, the OUN-UPA would not accept support from any country, which would not recognize Ukrainian sovereignty. Therefore, support from

Germany and the other Axis powers, was not available. Since the Soviet Union, one of the most powerful participants of the anti-Nazi bloc, was a major adversary, OUN-UPA could not expect any assistance from the Western Allies, like United Kingdom or United States. Therefore, OUN-UPA began its insurgency without any external support and would have to win or lose without external support.

However, because of cultural and historical specifications, which were exhausting from long-century occupations, cultural, religious discriminations, and desire to gain independence, as well as properly chosen uncompromised, radical political program and successful information operations, like “marching groups” concept, OUN-UPA gained almost absolute population support. This link became the pillar of OUN-UPA survivability. Only the state sponsored extreme terror programs of the Germans and the Soviets prevented a total popular uprising against the occupational forces.

Because of large-scale population support, OUN-UPA, initially started its forming with lack of human and material resources was able to mobilize its forces during comparative short period (from 1942 to 1944) up to the size and standards of conventional army of that time.

One of the biggest OUN-UPA shortcomings was sustainment. From the very beginning of the creation of the UPA, sustainment was one of the biggest concerns. Ukraine was occupied by Germany in a manner different from that of Poland, France or Yugoslavia. In those countries, the German occupation was a result of the war between two independent states; each of which had a well-organized and equipped armed force. When those countries failed to defeat the German invasion, their armies could switch to clandestine activities simply by changing conventional tactics to insurgent tactics.

Additionally, different from the Yugoslavian, French or Polish resistance, which received support from the United States, United Kingdom or even from the Soviet Union, fighting against both of Germans and Soviets, the Ukrainian insurgency did not have any external support. The Ukrainian insurgency did not have any logistic system. It needed to be created from the beginning, out of nothing.⁵⁸

Because of popular support and the principles of economy, storing and equal distribution of resources among whole area of operation, OUN-UPA did not have any lack of armament for several years after WWII ended. During different periods of activities, UPA units had qualitatively different armament. During fights against Germans by large size units, insurgents used the whole spectrum of army weapons, captured from the enemy, including field artillery and tanks. After the end of WWII, switching to the maneuver partisan warfare, the use of heavy weapons was no longer possible. Antitank weapons were used only during large combat actions, the rest of the time they were kept in storage. According to an NKVD report, in the territory of Western Ukraine during 1944, NKVD units captured 35 field artillery guns, 328 mortars, 211 anti-tank rifles, 321 heavy machine guns. During 1945, they captured only 3 field artillery guns, 28 mortars, 13 anti-tank rifles and 66 heavy machine guns. The same report stated, that NKVD units captured the UPA's cache on Polish territories, which contained 110 of 400mm self-propelled missiles of German production.⁵⁹

OUN-UPA grew up to the scale of convention army. The total amount of OUN-UPA members still is subject of disputes among historians. According to data of NKVD USSR, during the period from February 1944 to January 1946, as a result of operations, conducted by Soviet punitive units, 103,313 insurgents were killed, 110,785—arrested,

about 50,000–surrendered, a total of 280,000 troops. According the newest estimates, during whole period of existing OUN-UPA, more than 400,000 people went through the insurgent files.⁶⁰

Thus, summarized analysis of OUN-UPA activities through the frame of McCormick diagram is as following (see figure #). OUN-UPA could not, and did not, have any kind of support from the international community (5a). The same time, the Germans did not have assistance of international community either (5b). They had allies, participating in Eastern campaign, like Hungary and Romania, but because those states were part of occupational forces, they are not considered as international community. Therefore, all efforts in attempting to win this struggle were directed on gaining the popular support. The effective information engagement of the population, conducted by the OUN-UPA (1a), protecting the population from German authorities (2a), accompanied with the Germans' punitive, suppressive policy and the German refusal to moderate the occupational regime, turned the local population to the OUN-UPA side. Thus, popular support, increased and strengthened the OUN-UPA conducted an effective armed campaign, and as a result took control over significant territory of western and central Ukraine (3) (see figure 4). Taking heavy losses on the Eastern front, and directing all efforts to regain initiative in fights with the Soviets, the Germans did not do enough to suppress the insurgent movement in their rear. Because of that, as the front line moved west of Ukraine, the OUN-UPA remained ready to continue to fight for the Ukrainian independence with a new adversary—the Soviet Union.




Figure 4. OUN-UPA activities during German period (1941-1944) through McCormick's "Diamond" Model frame.

Source: Created by author from Gordon H. McCormick, "Lecture in Seminar on Guerilla Warfare" (Naval Postgraduate School, Montgomery, CA, 2003).

Analysis of the OUN-UPA activities during Soviet period

OUN-UPA situation was unchanged, having popular support and not having external support, when the Soviet Union reestablished control over the territory of Ukraine. OUN-UPA effectively adapted to the new adversary, and continued the struggle in to the late 1940s.

During 1945-1946, the organizational structures of both OUN(B) and UPA significantly changed. With the purpose to simplify the chain of command, the OUN clandestine command and control nodes of several levels were abolished. In addition, the list of functional chains of command, such as military, Ukrainian Red Cross, logistical chains, on all levels, were abolished. However, a new functional system of communication was organized within the General Povid, areal and sub-regional Provids

of OUN(B).⁶¹ Even in the worst circumstances, OUN leadership paid significant attention to protecting the functional chains of the propaganda and the security service.

During 1945-1946, because of the turn to new techniques of armed resistance, OUN(B) and UPA, in fact, became one organization, OUN-UPA. The change in tactics was reflected in the UPA task organization. Because OUN decided to act only in small size units, there appeared no more necessity to retain command and control nodes at battalion level and above. Most of the UPA was split into company-size units, or smaller, and attached to the OUN clandestine cells. These so called “self-defense shrub detachments,” tied together the OUN cells of several hamlets. The strength of each such detachment was about 30-50 persons. Those detachments conducted combat actions independently, coordinated with other similar detachments, or UPA units, which were deployed only in case of necessity.⁶²

Effective counterinsurgency measures, conducted by Soviet law enforcement forces and the impossibility of legalizing most of the UPA combatants forced the OUN-UPA leadership to find effective ways of protecting the organization cadres. Thus, the concept of “bunker warfare” was developed. The concept of bunker warfare meant many combinations of complex operations were conducted by small units using clandestine techniques to insure the protection and survivability of the insurgent forces. The main tenets of the bunker warfare concept were development of a specific strategy of armed, but non-violent resistance, and chain of command and control procedures. The bunkers became more sophisticated, and more dispersed over time. As the bunkers evolved, the builders used new techniques of locating and building bunkers, providing protection, and supplying the bunkers with necessary equipment and communication.⁶³

OUN-UPA widely conducted building of well hidden, protected shelters (bunker, *kryivka*–ukr.) of different constructions (in particular, just during January-April, 1946, in the region of Lvov, 2517 bunkers were destroyed as a result of Soviet counterinsurgency activities). In the village of Topilske (current region of Ivano-Frankovsk) forty four out of one hundred five bunkers were detected and destroyed.⁶⁴ Geography of the northern and western Ukraine favored “bunker warfare” (65 percent of the region of Stanislav, current Ivano-Frankovsk, is mountain and forested terrain, almost 80 percent of the regions of Rovno and Volyn is forested and swamped areas).

The preparation for the wide spread use of bunkers started in the spring of 1944 because of the overwhelming Soviet military and technical superiority over the Ukrainian insurgent movement. At that time, the leadership of UPA-North issued the order for the mass construction of concealed shelters for personnel and supplies. NKVD documents at that time reported detecting a number of storage sites for food and ammunition, and bunkers appointed as hospitals etc. The directions for the mass construction of such shelters were included in the operational order of the UPA-West Command number 2/44, issued on August 27, 1944, which emphasized preparatory measures prior to the Soviet occupation.

The personnel, employed for construction showed significant inventiveness. One of the shelters was found in the cupola of the church in the village of Pidhaychyky, Hlynyansk district, region of Lvov. The size of the shelters varied from individual (one person in in half lying position) to multi-room, multi-floor bunkers, constructed so substantially that even if an attacker detected one floor or room, the attacker did not necessarily detect the rest of the bunker. In the district of Zhabivsk, region of Ivano-

Frankovsk, there was an underground compound, which could house about one thousand insurgents.

Such bunker warfare could not exist without strict security and effective communication. One OUN document, “Organizational directions,” issued in April, 1950, stated: “It is possible to act for a long period by adhering to security measures. Enemy agents are everywhere. Thus, every insurgent must know the techniques of security as soldier must know a field manual. The insurgent must be able to live underground.”⁶⁵

Each bunker had a different functional purpose; shelters for personnel; storage for supplies; facilities for medical, communication, and special purposes. Personnel with engineering education were employed in constructing the bunkers. For example, a member of Main Provid of OUN, K. Ratych, who was a specialist in constructing fundamental bunkers and storage facilities, was in charge of building the bunker for R. Shuhevych, the Supreme Commander of UPA.⁶⁶

The memoir literature, written by participants of the Ukrainian insurgency movement, contains a wealth of information regarding the methodology of bunker construction and the techniques of long term occupation of a bunker. Significant input to the issue of examination of specifications of clandestine-insurgent movement is the thirty eighth volume of the “Chronicle of UPA” with the introductory article by the famous researcher of the Ukrainian insurgency, P. Potichniy. That volume is dedicated entirely to bunker construction as the “architecture of resistance.”⁶⁷

Carrying out those concepts would not have been possible without effective intelligence. The recently organized Security Service of OUN was responsible for intelligence activities, as well as for counterintelligence. As I. Kryvutskiy, the district

referent of the OUN(B) Security Service, stated during interrogation, “The Security Service collected intelligence information within its respective areas of operation. It collected the information about regular army, law enforcement forces, civil administration activities, and attitudes among civilians etc.”

The main provider of effective intelligence was the wide spread network of informants, established on the territorial and objective principles. The NKVD directions to the personnel in Western Ukraine, issued in July, 1945, emphasized effectiveness of OUN intelligence, which occurred in cities and villages, Soviet civil administration cells, recruitment offices, auxiliary police units, communication facilities.⁶⁸

Because the country area was the most secure and supportive for OUN-UPA, the foundation of the intelligence network was the informant organization of *shrub* cells. The instruction for those informants, issued in the region of Ivano-Frankovsk in May, 1946, said, that the *shrub* intelligence cell is conducted of the resident, his deputy and two to three informants. The ratio of informants to the local population was suggested as one to one hundred. Informants had to report relevant and accurate intelligence data not less than twice a week, maintaining strict security.⁶⁹

The OUN-UPA intelligence network also operated in the cities.⁷⁰ The clandestine intelligence cells worked actively to gain and analyze information about the Eastern Ukrainian territories. In particular, on December 26, 1949, in the village of Pyatrychany, located in the region of Kamyanets-Podolskiy, NKVD forces detected and searched the bunker of the OUN district executor. The NKVD found there files with data concerning the economic and social situation in the regions of Voroshilovgrad (current Donetsk) and Zaporozhe, and some areas of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan.⁷¹

The OUN Security Service successfully infiltrated the Soviet military and law enforcement institutions. Potential informants were found primarily among the junior leadership of the Red Army and police units. A well-known case demonstrating the OUN(B) recruitment procedures was that of a retired Army captain, who was the chief of the enlisted office in the district of Kalush (region of Ivano-Frankovsk). He enlisted to avoid OUN(B) blackmail.⁷² The questions, asked to the armor officer, the instructor of a military engineer college, the brother of covert OUN member, indicated the specific interest of the OUN intelligence about Soviet Armed Forces: division task organization, morale of the conscripts, Party propaganda and counterintelligence activities etc.⁷³ Information concerning high military leadership was of interest as well. For instance, the intelligence executor in the district of Tlumak put significant efforts into identifying the addresses in Stanislav (current Ivano-Frankovsk) of the Commander of the 38th Field Army, Colonel-General K. Moskalenko, with the purpose of assassination.⁷⁴

When infiltrating the law enforcement institutions, an intelligence executor tried first to recruit agents from among the district police servicemen, who originally came from the respective territories. If successfully recruited for covert intelligence activities, they were assigned to collect information about the strength, disposition, operational plans of NKVD forces, especially their agential networks.⁷⁵ Such recruitments were conducted not just on the background of ideological motivation, but also through private relations; sometimes family or sometimes intimate relations, followed by the final recruitment.

More evidence of the effectiveness of the OUN-UPA intelligence efforts was the huge number of intelligence reports concerning the defense potential of the USSR that

the OUN-UPA gathered. NKVD forces obtained OUN files concerning Red Army units across the entire Soviet Union, to include Karelia-Finnish SSR, Military district of Zabaykalie, East Germany and Kaliningrad.⁷⁶

However, in the late 1940s, OUN-UPA significantly slowed its activity. Ironically, the OUN Security Service initially was the guarantor of OUN-UPA security and ultimately became a major cause of the demise of the entire insurgency movement. During late 1940s, the atmosphere of spy-phobia, lack of qualified and experienced counterintelligence cadres, hate of the Soviet regime and the Soviet law enforcement machine caused much fear and confusion within OUN-UPA. As a result, the OUN Security Service maintained the security of the OUN-UPA primarily by the use of terror within its own organization.

Frequent groundless repressions within the OUN-UPA caused overwhelming mutual suspicion. According to Halyna Turchenyak, wife of the OUN leader in Galicia, “the circumstances of dissidence, mutual distrust, have caused splits among the members of some cells. They look at each other with suspicion. A significant amount of the cadre is ready to end clandestine activities and to begin a peaceful life. However, they are held in place only by repressions, conducted by the OUN leadership.”⁷⁷ Thus, the OUN-UPA dissolved from the inside. According to sub-regional OUN leader Turkivskiy, “heavy losses affected the remaining members, damaged their morale and caused political inertness. Therefore, many members escaped to their permanent places of residence, intending to surrender to the Bolsheviks.”⁷⁸ Thus, the terror, inflicted by the OUN Security Service among the organization, multiplied the challenges facing the anti-Soviet resistance. OUN(B) resorted to terrorizing the local inhabitants as a last resort to obtain

money, food, clothes, and medicine. There was no other means available to acquire the necessary items.

Soviet documents stated that roughly in 1949-1950, changes in the attitude of the local population became much more visible.⁷⁹ In addition to the continuous bloodshed, which began as early as 1939, the repression methods of the Soviet authorities, strengthened Soviet control in the region and enabled total collectivization.

At the end of 1952 and on into 1953, the nationalist clandestine network once and for all split into separate, unrelated cells. In April 1953, in his letter to the OUN General Provid abroad, the OUN-UPA Supreme Commander, Vasyl Kuk, described the situation in Ukraine as “catastrophic.” He wrote: “the leadership is destroyed. All activities are limited to self-protection and hoping for a better future. . . Continuous covert life has exhausted even the strongest cadres.”⁸⁰ On December 10, 1953, Ministry of Interior of Ukrainian SSR listed as wanted 98 armed covert members, dispersed in 37 districts of Western Ukraine, including 84 members, who worked in the clandestine operations from 1943-1944. During 1954, the list of wanted decreased to just 70 persons.⁸¹

The end to the armed resistance of the OUN-UPA clandestine net in Western Ukraine during mid-1950s simultaneously marked the end of the nationalist liberation movement in Ukraine.

The analysis of OUN-UPA activities through the frame of McCormick diagram is as following (see figure 5). After the Soviet Union reestablished control over the territory of Ukraine, the OUN-UPA remained not having any external support. Moreover, the defeat of the Nazi Germany and agreements, assigned by the heads of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom in Yalta in February, 1945, which particularly

determined state borders in “new” Europe, cut off any, even theoretically, chances to gain support from the international community (5a). The USSR’s position of the state-winner of the WWII made doubtless its legitimacy within the newly established borders, which were mutually agreed upon by the western allies during the conference in Yalta, in 1945 (5b). In addition, eliminating any hope of success and conducting successful punitive actions by law enforcement units, the Soviet government broke the link between the OUN-UPA and local population (2b). Therefore, with the disruption of the link with the local population, the defeat of Ukrainian nationalists by the overwhelming Soviet machine was simply an issue of time. Finally, conducting successful covert operations by the NKVD units, and eliminating the nationalists’ leadership, the Soviet machine shattered the OUN-UPA (3), and caused the eventual failure of the OUN-UPA.




Figure 5. OUN-UPA activities during Soviet period (1944-1954) through McCormick’s “Diamond” Model frame.

Source: Created by author from Gordon H. McCormick, “Lecture in Seminar on Guerilla Warfare” (Naval Postgraduate School, Montgomery, CA, 2003).

The 1940s-1950s Ukrainian insurgency eventually was unsuccessful because the international community did not support the movement and because the Soviet government was simply too large, too well organized, too ruthless, and too powerful for the insurgency to overcome. That situation changed when the Soviet government began to decay from within and the international community supported the Ukrainian independence movement. The Ukrainians finally gained their independence as the Soviet Union began to collapse in 1991.

¹Stuart Lyon, COIN Primer, Overview of Insurgency, 1-1.

²*Непогасний огонь віри* [*Inextinguishable Fire of Faith*] (Paris: Nationalistic Publishing in Europe, 1974), 659-661.

³ЛевШанковський [Lev Shankovskiy], *Історіяукраїнськоговійська: 1917-1995* [*The history of the Ukrainian Army: 1917-1995*] (Lviv: Svit, 1996), 19.

⁴СтепанБандера [Stepan Bandera], *Моїжиттєписнідані* [*My Life Story Data*], ed. ДанилоЧайковський [DanyloChaikovsky], *МосковськівбивціБандерипередсудом* [*Moskavian Bandera's Killers to Justice*](Munich, 1965), 439-445.

⁵ЦентральнийДержавнийАрхівГромадськихОрганізацій (ЦДАГО), фонд 1, опис 23, справа 931, аркуш 104-104а [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine, fund no. 1, inventory no. 23, file no. 931, 104-104a].

⁶ЦентральнийАрхівСлужбиБезпекиУкраїни [State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine], *Collection of documents about the structure and nature of anti-Soviet activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during the period of 1943-1954, Protocol of interrogation of A. Galytska (9.03.1945).*

⁷Центральний Державний Архів Вищих Органів Влади та Управління України, фонд 3838, опис 1, справа 94, аркуш 21 [Central State Archive of Higher Authorities and Government of Ukraine, fund no. 3838, inventory no. 1, file no. 94, 21].

⁸ВолодимирКосик [VolodymyrKosyuk], *Україна і Німеччина у Другійсвітовійвійні* [*Ukraine and Germany in WWII*] (Lviv: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1993), 238.

⁹Центральний Державний Архів Громадських Організацій (ЦДАГО), фонд 66, опис 1, справа 93, аркуш 19 [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine, fund no. 66, inventory no. 1, file no. 93, 19].

¹⁰Микола Лебедь [Mykola Lebed], *Українська Повстанська Армія. Частина I: Німецька Окупація України [Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Part I: German Occupation of Ukraine]* (Drogobych: Vidrozhennya, 1993), 40.

¹¹Тамара Першина [Tamara Pershyna], *Історія Застерігає: Трофейні Документи про Злочини Німецько-Фашистських Загарбників та Їхніх Пособників на Тимчасово Окупованій Території України в Роки Великої Вітчизняної Війни [History Warns: Documents About the Crimes of Nazi Invaders and Their Collaborators on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine During WWII]* (Kyiv: Political Literature Publishing of Ukraine, 1986), 247.

¹²Slawomir Orłowski and Radosław Ostrowicz, *Erich Koch Przed Polskim Sadem [Erich Koch at the Polish Trial]* (Moscow: Publishing of the Foreign Affairs University, 1961), 34.

¹³Академія Наук України [The Academy of Science of Ukraine], *Німецько-Фашистський Окупаційний Режим на Україні. Збірник Документів і Матеріалів [Nazi German Occupational Regime in Ukraine. Collection of documents and materials]* (Kyiv, 1963), 100.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 97-98.

¹⁵Іван Дашичев [Ivan Dashychev], *Банкрутство Стратегії Германського Фашизму. Історическіє Очерки. Документи и Матеріали [Bankruptcy Policies of Nazi Germany. Historical Essays. Documents and Materials]* (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), 131-134.

¹⁶Тамара Першина [Tamara Pershyna], *Історія Застерігає: Трофейні Документи про Злочини Німецько-Фашистських Загарбників та Їхніх Пособників на Тимчасово Окупованій Території України в Роки Великої Вітчизняної Війни [History Warns: Documents About the Crimes of Nazi Invaders and Their Collaborators on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine During WWII]*, 143-144.

¹⁷Анатолій Кентій [Anatoliy Kentiy], *Збройний Чин Українських Націоналістів [Armed Way of Ukrainian Nationalists]* (Kyiv: DCZD NAF, 2005), 302.

¹⁸Центральний Державний Архів Громадських Організацій (ЦДАГО), фонд 57, опис 4, справа 357, аркуш 45-48 [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine, fund no. 57, inventory no. 4, file no. 357, 45-48].

¹⁹ПетроМірчук [Petro Mirchuk], *УкраїнськаПовстанськаАрмія: 1942-1952* [*Ukrainian Insurgent Army: 1942-1952*], 233.

²⁰Ibid., 233-234.

²¹Ibid., 234-235.

²²Ibid., 238-239.

²³Ibid., 41.

²⁴Ibid., 249.

²⁵ПетроМірчук [Petro Mirchuk], *СтепанБандера: СимволРеволуційноїБезкомпромисовості* [*Stepan Bandera: The Symbol of Revolutionary Sturdiness*], 76.

²⁶ПетроМірчук [Petro Mirchuk], *УкраїнськаПовстанськаАрмія: 1942-1952* [*Ukrainian Insurgent Army: 1942-1952*], 249-250.

²⁷АнатолійКентій [AnatoliyKentiу], *ЗбройнийЧинУкраїнськихНаціоналістів* [*Armed Way of Ukrainian Nationalists*], 105.

²⁸Василь Верига [VasylVeryha], *На Зов Києва. УкраїнськийНаціоналізм II СвітовійВійні* [*On the Kyiv's Call. Ukrainian Nationalism in World War II*] (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1993), 204.

²⁹СтепанКасіян [StepanKasiyan], *Вогоньродитьсязіскри. . .* [*The fire rises of spark . . .*] (Toronto: Sribna Surma, 2001), 128.

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³²ГригорійСтецюк [HryhoriyStetsuk], *ЧорнідніВолині. 1941-1944 або непоставлений пам'ятник* [*Black Days of Volyn. 1941-1944 or non-established monument*] (Lutsk: Nadstyr'ya, 1992), 127.

³³АнатолійКентій [AnatoliyKentiу], *ЗбройнийЧинУкраїнськихНаціоналістів* [*Armed Way of Ukrainian Nationalists*], 246.

³⁴ВолодимирСергійчук [VolodymyrSerhiychuk], *ОУН-УПА в РокиВійни: НовіДокументи і Матеріали* [*OUN-UPA During the Years of War: New Documents and Files*] (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1996), 303.

³⁵ЛевШанковський [Lev Shankovskiy], *ПохідніГрупи ОУН [OUN Marching Groups]* (Munich: Ukrainskiy Samostiynyk, 1958), 59.

³⁶КлимДмитрук [KlymDmytruk], *Безбатченки [Orphans]* (Lviv: Kamenyar, 1974), 175.

³⁷АнатолійКентій [AnatoliyKentiу], *ЗбройнийЧинУкраїнськихНаціоналістів [Armed Way of Ukrainian Nationalists]*, 244.

³⁸ДмитроВеденєєвтаГенадійБиструхін [DmytroVedenyeev and HenadiуBystruhin], *ДвобійбезКомпромісів [The Fight Without Compromise]* (Kyiv, 2007), 67.

³⁹Ibid., 68.

⁴⁰Ibid., 69.

⁴¹Ibid., 70.

⁴²Ibid., 71.

⁴³АнатолійКентій [AnatoliyKentiу], *ЗбройнийЧинУкраїнськихНаціоналістів [Armed Way of Ukrainian Nationalists]*, 315.

⁴⁴ПетроМірчук [Petro Mirchuk], *УкраїнськаПовстанськаАрмія: 1942-1952 [Ukrainian Insurgent Army: 1942-1952]*, 33.

⁴⁵МиколаЛебедь [Mykola Lebed], *УкраїнськаПовстанськаАрмія. Частина I: НімецькаОкупаціяУкраїни [Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Part I: German Occupation of Ukraine]*, 50.

⁴⁶Олександр Денищук [OleksandrDenyshuk], *Боротьба УПА ПротиНімецькихОкупантів: том 1, Волинь [The Struggle of UPA Against German Occupants: volume 1, Volyn]* (Rovno: PPDM, 2008), 28.

⁴⁷ПетроМірчук [Petro Mirchuk], *УкраїнськаПовстанськаАрмія: 1942-1952 [Ukrainian Insurgent Army: 1942-1952]*, 87-89.

⁴⁸Ibid., 90.

⁴⁹Іван Білас [IvanBilas], *Репресивно-каральна система в Україні 1917-1953. Том I [Punitive System in Ukraine in 1917-1953. Part I]* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1994), 272

⁵⁰ПетроМірчук [Petro Mirchuk], *УкраїнськаПовстанськаАрмія: 1942-1952 [Ukrainian Insurgent Army: 1942-1952]*, 109-110.

⁵¹ДмитроВеденєєвтаГенадійБиструхін [DmytroVedenyeev and HenadiyBystruhin], *ДвобійбезКомпромісів [The Fight Without Compromise]*, 53.

⁵²Ibid., 54.

⁵³ДмитроВеденєєвтаГенадійБиструхін [DmytroVedenyeev and HenadiyBystruhin], *ДвобійбезКомпромісів [The Fight Without Compromise]*, 54.

⁵⁴Ibid., 106.

⁵⁵Ibid., 126.

⁵⁶Ibid., 124.

⁵⁷Ibid., 125.

⁵⁸ПетроМірчук [Petro Mirchuk], *УкраїнськаПовстанськаАрмія: 1942-1952 [Ukrainian Insurgent Army: 1942-1952]*, 25.

⁵⁹СергейТкаченко [Sergey Tkachenko], *ПовстанческаяАрмия: Тактикаборьбы [Insurgent Army: The Tactics of Fight]* (Moscow-Minsk: Publishing AST, 2000), 85.

⁶⁰“OUN-UPA: Organization,” ОУН-УПА: ЛегендаСупротиву [OUN-UPA: The Legend of Resistance], <http://oun-upa.info/organization/> (accessed 14 February 2011).

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⁶²ПетроМірчук [Petro Mirchuk], *УкраїнськаПовстанськаАрмія: 1942-1952 [Ukrainian Insurgent Army: 1942-1952]*, 237.

⁶³ДмитроВеденєєвтаГенадійБиструхін [DmytroVedenyeev and HenadiyBystruhin], *ДвобійбезКомпромісів [The Fight Without Compromise]*, 58.

⁶⁴Ibid., 57.

⁶⁵Ibid., 58.

⁶⁶Ibid., 59.

⁶⁷Ibid., 57.

⁶⁸Ibid., 80.

⁶⁹Ibid., 83.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid., 85.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid., 86.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid., 87.

⁷⁷Ibid., 120.

⁷⁸Ibid., 121.

⁷⁹Ibid., 122.

⁸⁰Ibid., 125.

⁸¹Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

In the context of studying the subject of insurgency, the OUN-UPA is one of the unique examples. The uniqueness of the OUN-UPA and its liberation struggle was that of not having their own state, their own armed forces or any kind of materiel resources. Ukrainian nationalists consolidated their positions and organized a nationwide liberation resistance in a short time and under conditions of international isolation. They chose to fight an uncompromised war “on two fronts,” e.g. against Communist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and resisted occupying powers for about twelve years; somewhat longer than the average duration of the typical insurgency movement.

Despite foreseeing probable conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, both OUN wings accepted collaboration with Germany in fighting against the Soviet Union. OUN(B) formulated a clear political program which accepted cooperation only with those foreign states, which would recognize the legitimacy of an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state. The German position concerning the Ukrainian “problem” (that of never recognizing an independent Ukraine) was understood well by the nationalists after the declaration of the Act of Independence on 30 June, 1941 in Lviv. After that, the Ukrainian nationalistic liberation movement appeared without any external support to face two overwhelming enemies: Germany and the Soviet Union.

OUN’s success during the initial period of founding the covert network and organizing the UPA can be explained by the groundswell of local support of the population. The population supported the OUN goals completely. The local support

offset, at least initially, the lack of foreign support for the insurgency. The actions of the occupying governments clearly demonstrated the hopelessness of the future to the population of life under either government. Their actions made OUN-UPA popular among the wide mass of the population and guaranteed the popular support to the insurgency.

Because of almost absolute popular support, the UPA grew up to the scale of a regular army, and built up its potential for the future armed struggle. A lot was done during the initial period. A simple and effective command and control system on all echelons was built. Training centers formed. Logistical systems evolved. These three systems sustained the OUN-UPA even during the fights against the Soviets. The popular support strengthened the OUN-UPA across all war fighting functions; but especially logistics, intelligence and protection.

In summer 1944, the Soviet Union reestablished control over the territory of Ukraine. OUN-UPA suffered heavy losses during first years after WWII ended because of the punitive operations conducted by the Soviet law enforcement forces. However, OUN-UPA understood the new adversary and adapted to new ways of fighting the Soviets. The OUN-UPA leadership refused to operate in large size units and switched to clandestine work, directed primarily on political sabotage and protection of the population. Because of those steps, OUN-UPA could significantly save its cadres and recuperate fast after each Soviet counterinsurgency operation.

However, not just nationalists examined the operations and learned from the fights. The Soviet authorities understood that the OUN-UPA effectiveness was explained by the support of the population. Thus, the Soviet Union understood that the defeat of the

nationalist liberation movement was just a matter of time, if the link between the insurgents and the population could be broken. During a relatively short time, the Soviet law enforcement forces achieved that end state. NKVD forces showed impressive creativity and professionalism in conducting covert operations and succeeded in infiltrating the OUN-UPA. Infiltrated NKVD agents conducted activities to compromise and discredit nationalists' leadership and created an atmosphere of distrust and uncertainty among the nationalist cadres, greatly damaging OUN-UPA morale. Blockade operations, aimed at eliminating and destroying insurgent detachments, combined with Soviet covert operations and information operations, significantly weakened the nationalist resistance during the late 1940s.

In addition, the NKVD applied the methods of "collective responsibility," and inflicted mass punishment upon the civilians in every case of even a single piece of evidence connecting the people to the insurgents. Thousands of Ukrainians were deported to the Eastern territories of the Soviet Union. Thousands of Ukrainians were executed. The most subtle technique, which the NKVD conducted to discredit OUN-UPA, was forming NKVD detachments that dressed in UPA uniform and spoke Ukrainian and conducted raids throughout the Western Ukrainian territories. These units terrorized the local population. They robbed, raped and killed Ukrainian non-combatants, instilling in the population a hatred of the OUN-UPA.

Because of the intensive and violent Soviet counterinsurgency campaign, the support of insurgents by the local population was destroyed and the whole liberation movement was disrupted. Even if the local population continued to support the nationalists, the OUN-UPA was doomed to the defeat. The OUN-UPA simply was not

physically able to conduct continued armed resistance against the overwhelming might of the Soviet machine. Only if OUN-UPA had received massive external support from the international community, recognition by the international community of the rights of Ukrainian people for self-determination could the insurgency even hope to succeed. The international community support was the critical vulnerability of the OUN-UPA, which caused the demise of the insurgency.

However, some of nationalist leaders, like Lev Rebet and Mykola Lebed, understood the fruitlessness of the armed or covert resistance and expressed the idea of “legal” resistance, e.g. integrating into the Soviet political institutions, Armed Forces, and law enforcement forces with the end state of overthrowing the Soviets in the future. The OUN-UPA defeat in the mid-1950s destroyed most, but not all of the Ukrainian liberation movement. The defeat of the nationalists was like compressing a spring. In addition to the Ukraine, there were a lot of such compressed springs throughout the Soviet Union, like in the Baltic countries, the Caucasus, and the Central Asian republics. When those compressed springs were released, the result was independence for those suppressed countries. The needed variable was time, as in time, the Soviet Union collapsed from within.

The unanimous voting by the Ukrainian population and the Declaration of Independence in August 1991 is evidence that the idea of nationalist self-determination was not dead, but just temporary suppressed. The cornerstone of Ukrainian independence was the liberation movement during the 1940s-1950s.

Recommendations

The significance of the study is that even though OUN-UPA failed eventually because of a lack of external support, some aspects of the insurgency would be useful for the Ukrainian Army to analyze today.

The study of insurgency is important now. The Ukrainian Army must understand the causes of insurgencies and the tactics, techniques, and procedures of countering insurgencies. Individuals, tribes, nations, groups ranging from small to large, and people organized according to blood, ideology or convenience, continue to compete for power and control. Thus, insurgency appeared as part of conflicts in a number of states; like Afghanistan, Yemen, Colombia, and the Russian Federation.

Ukraine has several problem areas or hotspots, where the situation is favorable for the escalation of separatism. Those hotspots are territories populated with national minorities, which use grievances based upon economic, cultural or political grounds to express their desire for separation from the Ukraine. Examples of such hotspots are the Crimea Republic and the territories of Bukovina and Zakarpatie.⁹⁹ The threat to Ukrainian national security should be understood and considered seriously and carefully by the Ukrainian Government. The examination of the subject of insurgency, particularly the case study of OUN-UPA, will help to understand the nature of insurgency and will help to develop the mechanism of defeating, or even preventing insurgency.

Ukrainian military and law enforcement forces could use the study of the OUN-UPA to develop interagency doctrine regarding appropriate measures to counter the internal threat within the territory of Ukraine. In the same way as the OUN(B), as a political group and covert organization, was interrelated with the UPA, as an armed

formation, the current Ukrainian law enforcement forces could coordinate with the Ukrainian armed forces in preparing and planning nationwide actions in case of external intervention. Law enforcement forces' role (Security Service or Ministry of Interior of Ukraine) in such coordination would be to prepare covert cadres to coordinate with and act with military personnel, trained in unconventional warfare (e.g. Special Operation Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces). Even though the small unit tactics of the UPA did not significantly differ from other guerilla warfare tactics, some techniques such as bunker warfare, marching groups, and information operations, could be examined and applied to the current doctrine and practice.

Another significance of this study is the historical aspect. To gain support of the pro-Russian population, some politicians are trying to discredit the Ukrainian nationalist liberation movement and to identify them as Nazi collaborators.¹⁰⁰ Because of the significant Communist influence in Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine, which started about twenty years prior to WWII, combined with the Soviet propaganda for nearly seventy years, people's opinion in those regions regarding the issue of nationalism is emotional and controversial. The lack of knowledge and understanding of the facts causes tensions among the Ukrainian population today. Examining the nationalist liberation movement, particularly the case of OUN-UPA, and integrating this issue into the academic programs of educational institutions of all levels will help to prevent the misinterpretation of the Ukrainian history. The better we know our history, the more opportunity we have to reach a better future

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¹⁰⁰ Роман Лебедь [Roman Lebed], “УПА: Історики Проти Політиків” [“UPA: Historians Against Politicians,”] *BBC, Kyiv*, 14 October 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/politics/2011/10/111013_ura_anniversary_rl.shtml (accessed 7 May 2012); “Колесниченко: Необхідимо Формувати Мнение про ОУН-УПА на Основі Історических Документів” [“Kolesnichenko: It is Necessary to Form Opinion About UPA Based upon Historical Materials,”] *Багнет [Bahnet]*, 16 December 2011, <http://www.bagnet.org/news/politics/169388> (accessed 7 May 2012)

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